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1 Introduction
For most of its history, mathematics was algorithmic in nature. The geometric
claims in Euclid’s Elements fall into two distinct categories: “problems,” which
assert that a construction can be carried out to meet a given specification, and
“theorems,” which assert that some property holds of a particular geometric
configuration. For example, Proposition 10 of Book I reads “To bisect a given
straight line.” Euclid’s “proof” gives the construction, and ends with the (Greek
equivalent of) Q.E.F., for quod erat faciendum, or “that which was to be done.”
Proofs of theorems, in contrast, end with Q.E.D., for quod erat demonstran-
dum, or “that which was to be shown”; but even these typically involve the
construction of auxiliary geometric objects in order to verify the claim.
Similarly, algebra was devoted to developing algorithms for solving equa-
tions. This outlook characterized the subject from its origins in ancient Egypt
and Babylon, through the ninth century work of al-Khwarizmi, to the solutions
to the quadratic and cubic equations in Cardano’s Ars Magna of 1545, and to
Lagrange’s study of the quintic in his Re´flexions sur la re´solution alge´brique des
e´quations of 1770.
The theory of probability, which was born in an exchange of letters between
Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654 and developed further by Christian
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Huygens and Jakob Bernoulli, provided methods for calculating odds related to
games of chance. Abraham de Moivre’s 1718 monograph on the subject was
entitled The Doctrine of Chances: or, a Method for Calculating the Probabil-
ities of Events in Play. Pierre de Laplace’s monumental The´orie analytique
des probabilite´s expanded the scope of the subject dramatically, addressing sta-
tistical problems related to everything from astronomical measurement to the
measurement in the social sciences and the reliability of testimony. Even so, the
emphasis remained fixed on explicit calculation.
Analysis had an algorithmic flavor as well. In the early seventeenth century,
Cavalieri, Fermat, Pascal, and Wallis developed methods of computing “quadra-
tures,” or areas of regions bounded by curves, as well as volumes. In the hands of
Newton, the calculus became a method of explaining and predicting the motion
of heavenly and sublunary objects. Euler’s Introductio in Analysis Infinitorum
of 1748 was the first work to base the calculus explicitly on the notion of a
function; but, for Euler, functions were given by piecewise analytic expressions,
and once again, his focus was on methods of calculation.
All this is not to say that all the functions and operations considered by
mathematicians were computable in the modern sense. Some of Euclid’s con-
structions involve a case split on whether two points are equal or not, and,
similarly, Euler’s piecewise analytic functions were not always continuous. In
contrast, we will see below that functions on the reals that are computable in
the modern sense are necessarily continuous. And even though Euler’s work is
sensitive to the rates of convergence of analytic expressions, these rates were
not made explicit. But these are quibbles, and, generally speaking, mathemati-
cal arguments through the eighteenth century provided informal algorithms for
finding objects asserted to exist.
The situation changed dramatically in the nineteenth century. Galois’ the-
ory of equations implicitly assumed that all the roots of a polynomial exist
somewhere, but Gauss’ 1799 proof of the fundamental theorem of algebra, for
example, did not show how to compute them. In 1837, Dirichlet considered the
example of a “function” from the real numbers to the real numbers which is
equal to 1 on the rationals and 0 on the irrationals, without pausing to consider
whether such a function is calculable in any sense. The Bolzano-Weierstraß
Theorem, first proved by Bolzano in 1817, asserts that any bounded sequence
of real numbers has a convergent subsequence; in general, there will be no way
of computing such a subsequence. Riemann’s proof of the open mapping the-
orem was based on the Dirichlet principle, an existence principle that is not
computationally valid. Cantor’s work on the convergence of Fourier series led
him to consider transfinite iterations of point-set operations, and, ultimately, to
develop the abstract notion of set.
Although the tensions between conceptual and computational points of view
were most salient in analysis, other branches of mathematics were not immune.
For example, in 1871, Richard Dedekind defined the modern notion of an ideal
in a ring of algebraic integers, and defined operations on ideals in a purely
extensional way. In other words, the operations were defined in such a way
that they do not presuppose any particular representation of the ideals, and
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definitions do not indicate how to compute the operations in terms of such
representations. More dramatically, in 1890, Hilbert proved what is now known
as the Hilbert Basis Theorem. This asserts that, given any sequence f1, f2, f3, ...
of multivariate polynomials over a Noetherian ring, there is some n such that for
every m ≥ n, fm is in the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fn. Such an m cannot be
computed by surveying elements of the sequence, since it is not even a continuous
function on the space of sequences; even if a sequence x, x, x, . . . starts out
looking like a constant sequence, one cannot rule out the possibility that the
element 1 will eventually appear.
Such shifts were controversial, and raised questions as to whether the new,
abstract, set-theoretic methods were appropriate to mathematics. Set-theoretic
paradoxes in the early twentieth century raised the additional question as to
whether they are even consistent. Brouwer’s attempt, in the 1910’s, to found
mathematics on an “intuitionistic” conception raised a further challenge to mod-
ern methods, and in 1921, Hermann Weyl, Hilbert’s best student, announced
that he was joining the Brouwerian revolution. The twentieth century Grund-
lagenstreit, or “crisis of foundations,” was born.
At that point, two radically different paths were open to the mathematical
community:
• Restrict the methods of mathematics so that mathematical theorems have
direct computational validity. In particular, restrict methods so that sets
and functions asserted to exist are computable, as well as infinitary math-
ematical objects and structures more generally; and also ensure that quan-
tifier dependences are also constructive, so that a “forall-exists” statement
asserts the existence of a computable transformation.
• Expand the methods of mathematics to allow idealized and abstract oper-
ations on infinite objects and structures, without concern as to how these
objects are represented, and without concern as to whether the operations
have a direct computational interpretation.
Mainstream contemporary mathematics has chosen decisively in favor of the
latter. But computation is important to mathematics, and faced with a noncon-
structive development, there are options available to those specifically interested
in computation. For example, one can look for computationally valid versions of
nonconstructive mathematical theorems, as one does in computable and compu-
tational mathematics, constructive mathematics, and numerical analysis. There
are, in addition, various ways of measuring the extent to which ordinary theo-
rems fail to be computable, and characterizing the data needed to make them
so.
With Turing’s analysis of computability, we now have precise ways of saying
what it means for various types of mathematical objects to be computable,
stating mathematical theorems in computational terms, and specifying the data
relative to which operations of interest are computable. Section 2 thus discusses
computable analysis, whereby mathematical theorems are made computationally
significant by stating the computational content explicitly.
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There are still communities of mathematicians, however, who are committed
to developing mathematics in such a way that every concept and assertion has
an implicit computational meaning. Turing’s analysis of computability is useful
here, too, in a different way: by representing such styles of mathematics in
formal axiomatic terms, we can make this implicit computational interpretation
mathematically explicit. Section 3 thus discusses different styles of constructive
mathematics, and the computational semantics thereof.
2 Computable analysis
2.1 From Leibniz to Turing
An interest in the nature of computation can be found in the seventeenth century
work of Leibniz (see [47]). For example, his stepped reckoner improved on earlier
mechanical calculating devices like the one of Pascal. It was the first calculating
machine that was able to perform all four basic arithmetical operations, and it
earned Leibniz an external membership of the British Royal Society at the age
of 24. Leibniz’s development of calculus is better known, as is the corresponding
priority dispute with Newton. Leibniz paid considerable attention to choosing
notations and symbols carefully in order to facilitate calculation, and his use
of the integral symbol
∫
and the d symbol for derivatives have survived to the
present day. Leibniz’s work on the binary number system, long before the advent
of digital computers, is also worth mentioning. A more important contribution
to the study of computation was his notion of a calculus ratiocinator, that is, a
calculus of reasoning. Such a calculus, Leibniz held, would allow one to resolve
disputes in a purely mathematical fashion:1
The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible
as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a
glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply
say: Let us calculate, without further ado, to see who is right.
His attempts to develop such a calculus amount to an early form of symbolic
logic.
With this perspective, it is not farfetched to see Leibniz as initiating a series
of developments that culminate in Turing’s work. Norbert Wiener has described
the relationship in the following way [232]:
The history of the modern computing machine goes back to Leibniz
and Pascal. Indeed, the general idea of a computing machine is
nothing but a mechanization of Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator. It
is, therefore, not at all remarkable that the theory of the present
computing machine has come to meet the later developments of the
algebra of logic anticipated by Leibniz. Turing has even suggested
that the problem of decision, for any mathematical situation, can
1Leibniz, The Art of Discovery, 1685 [233].
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always be reduced to the construction of an appropriate computing
machine.
2.2 From Borel to Turing
Perhaps the first serious attempt to express the mathematical concepts of a
computable real number and a computable function on the real numbers were
made by E´mil Borel around 1912, the year that Alan Turing was born. Borel
defined computable real numbers as follows:2
We say that a number α is computable if, given a natural number
n, we can obtain a rational number that differs from α by at most
1
n
.
Of course, before the advent of Turing machines or any other formal notion
of computability, the meaning of the phrase “we can obtain” remained vague.
But Borel provided the following additional information in a footnote to that
phrase:
I intentionally leave aside the practical length of operations, which
can be shorter or longer; the essential point is that each operation
can be executed in finite time with a safe method that is unambigu-
ous.
This makes it clear that Borel had an intuitive notion of an algorithm in
mind. Borel then indicated the importance of number representations, and
argued that decimal expansions have no special theoretical value, whereas con-
tinued fraction expansions are not invariant under arithmetic operations and
hence of no practical value. He went on to discuss the problem of determining
whether two real numbers are equal:
The first problem in the theory of computable numbers is the prob-
lem of equality of two such numbers. If two computable numbers
are unequal, this can obviously be noticed by computing both with
sufficient precision, but in general it will not be known a priori. One
can make clear progress in determining a lower bound on the dif-
ference of two computable numbers, whose definitions satisfy known
conditions.
In modern terms, what Borel seems to recognize here is that although there
is no algorithm that decides whether two computable real numbers are equal,
the inequality relation between computable reals is, at least, computably enu-
merable. He then discussed a notion of the height of a number, which is based
on counting the number of steps needed to construct that number, in a certain
2All citations of Borel are from [19], which is a reprint of [18]. The translations here are
by the authors of this article; obvious mistakes in the original have been corrected.
5
way. This concept can be seen as an early forerunner of the concept of Kol-
mogorov complexity. Borel considered ways that this concept might be utilized
in addressing the equality problem.
In another section of his paper, Borel discussed the concept of a computable
real number function, which he defined as follows:
We say that a function is computable if its value is computable for
any computable value of the variable. In other words, if α is a
computable number, one has to know how to compute the value of
f(α) with precision 1
n
for any n. One should not forget that, by
definition, to be given a computable number α just means to be
given a method to obtain an arbitrary approximation to α.
It is worth noting that Borel only demanded computability at computable
inputs in his definition. His definition is vague in the sense that he did not indi-
cate whether he had in mind an algorithm that transfers a method to compute
α into a method to compute f(α) (which would later become known as Markov
computability or the Russian approach) or whether he had in mind an algorithm
that transfers an approximation of α into an approximation of f(α) (which is
closer to what we now call a computable function on the real numbers, under
the Polish approach). He also did not say explicitly that his algorithm to com-
pute f is meant to be uniform, but this seems to be implied by his subsequent
observation:
A function cannot be computable, if it is not continuous at all com-
putable values of the variable.
A footnote to this observation then indicates that he had the Polish approach
in mind:3
In order to make the computation of a function effectively possible
with a given precision, one additionally needs to know the modulus
of continuity of the function, which is the [...] relation [...] between
the variation of the function values with respect to the variation of
the variable.
Borel went on to discuss different types of discontinuous functions, including
those that we now call Borel measurable. In fact, the entire discussion of com-
putable real numbers and computable real functions is preliminary to Borel’s
development of measure theory, and the discussion was meant to motivate as-
pects of that development.
3Hence Borel’s result that computability implies continuity cannot be seen as an early
version of the famous theorem of Ce˘ıtin, in contrast to what is suggested in [215]. The
aforementioned theorem states that any Markov computable function is already effectively
continuous on computable inputs and hence computable in Borel’s sense, see sections 2.5 and
3, Figure 5. While this is a deep result, the observation that computable functions in Borel’s
sense are continuous is obvious.
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2.3 Turing on computable analysis
Turing’s landmark 1936 paper [208] is titled “On computable numbers, with an
application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” It begins as follows:
The “computable” numbers may be described briefly as the real
numbers whose expressions as a decimal are calculable by finite
means. Although the subject of this paper is ostensibly the com-
putable numbers, it is almost equally easy to define and investigate
computable functions of an integrable variable or a real or com-
putable variable, computable predicates, and so forth. The funda-
mental problems involved are, however, the same in each case, and
I have chosen the computable numbers for explicit treatment as in-
volving the least cumbrous technique. I hope shortly to give an
account of the relations of the computable numbers, functions, and
so forth to one another. This will include a development of the the-
ory of functions of a real variable expressed in terms of computable
numbers. According to my definition, a number is computable if its
decimal can be written down by a machine.
At least two things are striking about these opening words. The first is
that Turing chose not to motivate his notion of computation in terms of the
ability to characterize the notion of a computable function from N to N, or
the notion of a computable set of natural numbers, as in most contemporary
presentations; but, rather, in terms of the ability to characterize the notion
of a computable real number. In fact, Section 10 is titled “Examples of large
classes of numbers which are computable.” There, he introduced the notion of a
computable function on computable real numbers, and the notion of computable
convergence for a sequence of computable numbers, and so on; and argued that,
for example, e and pi and the real zeros of the Bessel functions are computable.
The second striking fact is that he also flagged his intention of developing a
full-blown theory of computable real analysis. As it turns out, this was a task
that ultimately fell to his successors, as we explain below.
The precise definition of a computable real number given by Turing in the
original paper can be expressed as follows: a real number r is computable if there
is a computable sequence of 0’s and 1’s with the property that the fractional
part of r is equal to the real number obtained by prefixing that sequence with
a binary point. There is a slight problem with this definition, however, which
Turing discussed in a later correction [209], published in 1937. Suppose we have
a procedure that, for every i, outputs a rational number qi with the property
that
|r − qi| < 2
−i.
Intuitively, in that case, we would also want to consider r to be a computable
real number, because we can compute it to any desired accuracy. In fact, it is not
hard to show that this second definition coincides with the first: a real number
has a computable binary expansion if and only if it is possible to compute
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it in the second sense. In other words, the two definitions are extensionally
equivalent.
The problem, however, is that it is not possible to pass uniformly between
these two representations, in a computable way. For example, suppose a pro-
cedure of the second type begins to output the sequence of approximations
1/2, 1/2, 1/2, . . .. Then it is difficult to determine what the first binary digit
is, because at some point the output could jump just above or just below 1/2.
This intuition can be made precise: allowing the sequence in general to depend
on the halting behavior of a Turing machine, one can show that there is no al-
gorithmic procedure which, given a description of a Turing machine describing
a real number by a sequence of rational approximations, computes the digits
of r. On the other hand, for any fixed description of the first sort, there is a
computable description of the second sort: either r is a dyadic rational, which is
to say, it has a finite binary expansion; or waiting long enough will always pro-
vide enough information to determine the digits. So the difference only shows
up when one wishes to talk about computations which take descriptions of real
numbers as input. In that case, as Turing noted, the second type of definition
is more natural; and, as we will see below, these are the descriptions of the
computable reals that form the basis for computable analysis.
Turing’s second representation of computable reals, presented in his correc-
tion [209], is given by the formula
(2i− 1)n+
∞∑
r=1
(2cr − 1)
(
2
3
)r
,
where i and n provide the integer part of the represented number and the binary
sequence cr the fractional part. This representation is essentially what has later
been called a signed-digit representation with base 23 . It is interesting that
Turing acknowledged Brouwer’s influence (see also [72]):
This use of overlapping intervals for the definition of real numbers
is due originally to Brouwer.
In the 1936 paper, in addition to discussing individual computable real num-
bers, Turing also defined the notion of a computable function on real numbers.
Like Borel, he adopted the standpoint that the input to such a function needs
to be computable itself:
We cannot define general computable functions of a real variable,
since there is no general method of describing a real number, but we
can define a computable function of a computable variable.
A few years later Turing introduced oracle machines [211], which would have
allowed him to handle computable functions on arbitrary real inputs, simply by
considering the input as an oracle given from outside and not as being itself
computed in some specific way. But the 1936 definition ran as follows. First,
Turing extended his definition of computable real numbers γn from the unit
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interval to all real numbers using the formula αn = tan(pi(γn −
1
2 )). He went
on:
Now let ϕ(n) be a computable function which can be shown to be
such that for any satisfactory4 argument its value is satisfactory.
Then the function f , defined by f(αn) = αϕ(n), is a computable
function and all computable functions of a computable variable are
expressible in this form.
Hence, Turing’s definition of a computable function on the real numbers
essentially coincides with Markov’s definition, which would later form the ba-
sis of the Russian approach to computable analysis (see sections 2.6 and 3.5).
Computability of f is not defined in terms of approximations, but in terms of
functions ϕ that transfer algorithms that describe the input into algorithms that
describe the output. There are at least three objections against the technical de-
tails of Turing’s definition, some of which have already been addressed by Guido
Gherardi in [72], which is the first careful discussion of Turing’s contributions
to computable analysis:
1. Turing used the binary representation of real numbers in order to define γn,
and hence the derived notion of a computable real function is somewhat
unnatural and restrictive. However, we can consider this problem as being
repaired by Turing’s second approach to computable reals in [209], which
we have described above.
2. Turing should have mentioned that the function f is only well-defined
by f(αn) = αϕ(n) if ϕ is extensional in the sense that αn = αk implies
αϕ(n) = αϕ(k). However, we can safely assume that this is what he had
in mind, since otherwise his equation does not even define a single-valued
function.
3. Turing did not allow arbitrary suitable computable functions ϕ, but he
restricted his definition to total functions ϕ. However, it is an easy exer-
cise to show that for any partial computable ϕ that maps all satisfactory
numbers to satisfactory numbers there is a total computable function ψ
such that ψ(n) and ϕ(n) are numbers of the same total computable func-
tion for all satisfactory inputs n. Hence the restriction to total ϕ is not
an actual restriction.
These three considerations support our claim that Turing’s definition of a com-
putable real function is essentially the same as Markov’s definition.
It is worth pointing out that Turing introduced another important theme
in computable analysis, namely, developing computable versions of theorems of
analysis. For instance, he pointed out:
4Turing calls a natural number n satisfactory if, in modern terms, n is a Go¨del index of a
total computable function.
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... we cannot say that a computable bounded increasing sequence of
computable numbers has a computable limit.
This shows that Turing was aware of the fact that the Monotone Convergence
Theorem cannot be proved computably. He did, however, provide a (weak)
computable version of the Intermediate Value Theorem:
(vi) If α and β are computable and α < β and ϕ(α) < 0 < ϕ(β),
where ϕ(a) is a computable increasing continuous function,
then there is a unique computable number γ, satisfying α <
γ < β and ϕ(γ) = 0.
The fact that the limit of a computable sequence of computable real numbers
need not be computable motivates the introduction of the concept of computable
convergence:
We shall say that a sequence βn of computable numbers converges
computably if there is a computable integral valued function N(ε) of
the computable variable ε, such that we can show that, if ε > 0 and
n > N(ε) and m > N(ε), then |βn − βm| < ε. We can then show
that
(vii) A power series whose coefficients form a computable sequence
of computable numbers is computably convergent at all com-
putable points in the interior of its interval of convergence.
(viii) The limit of a computably convergent sequence is computable.
And with the obvious definition of “uniformly computably conver-
gent”:
(ix) The limit of a uniformly computably convergent computable
sequence of computable functions is a computable function.
Hence
(x) The sum of a power series whose coefficients form a computable
sequence is a computable function in the interior of its interval
of convergence.
From (viii) and pi = 4(1− 13+
1
5−...) we deduce that pi is computable.
From e = 1+1+ 12! +
1
3! + ... we deduce that e is computable. From
(vi) we deduce that all real algebraic numbers are computable. From
(vi) and (x) we deduce that the real zeros of the Bessel functions are
computable.
Here we need to warn the reader that Turing erred in (x): the mere com-
putability of the sequences of coefficients of a power series does not guarantee
computable convergence on the whole interior of its interval of convergence, but
only on each compact subinterval thereof (see Theorem 7 in [174] and Exer-
cise 6.5.2 in [224]).
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Before we leave Turing behind, some of his other, related work is worth
mentioning. For example, in 1938, Turing published an article, “Finite Approx-
imations to Lie Groups” [210], in the Annals of Mathematics, addressing the
question as to which infinite Lie groups can be approximated by finite groups.
The idea of approximating infinitary mathematical objects by finite ones is cen-
tral to computable analysis. The problem that Turing considered here is more
restrictive in that he required that the approximants be groups themselves, and
the paper is not in any way directly related to computability; but the paral-
lel is interesting. What is more directly relevant is the fact that Turing was
not only interested in computing real numbers and functions in theory, but in
practice. The Turing archive5 contains a sketch of a proposal, in 1939, to build
an analog computer that would calculate approximate values for the Riemann
zeta-function on the critical line. His ingenious method was published in 1943
[212], and in a paper published in 1953 [214] he described calculations that
were carried out in 1950 on the Manchester University Mark 1 Electronic Com-
puter. Finally, we mention that, in a paper of 1948 [213], Turing studied linear
equations from the perspective of algebraic complexity. There he introduced
the concepts of a condition number and of ill-conditioned equations, which are
widely used in numerical mathematics nowadays. (For a discussion of this work,
see Lenore Blum’s contribution to this collection, as well as [72].) In some very
interesting unpublished work Turing provided an algorithm to compute an ab-
solutely normal real number (see the discussion by Becher et. al. in [13]) and in
this way he even made an early contribution to algorithmic randomness.
2.4 From Turing to Specker
Turing’s ideas on computable real numbers where taken up in 1949 by Ernst
Specker [201], who completed his Ph.D. in Zu¨rich under Hopf in the same year.
Specker was probably attracted to logic by Paul Bernays, whom he thanks in
that paper. Specker constructed a computable monotone bounded sequence
(xn) whose limit is not a computable real number, thus establishing Turing’s
claim. In modern terms one can easily describe such a sequence: given an
injective computable enumeration f : N → N of a computably enumerable but
non-computable set K ⊆ N, the partial sums
xn =
n∑
i=0
2−f(i)
form a computable sequence without a computable limit. Such sequences are
now sometimes called Specker sequences.
It is less well-known that Specker also studied different representations of real
numbers in that paper, including the representation by computably converging
Cauchy sequences, the decimal representation, and the Dedekind cut represen-
tation (via characteristic functions). In particular, he considered both prim-
itive recursive and general computable representations in all three instances.
5See AMT/C/2 in http://www.turingarchive.org/browse.php/C.
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His main results include the fact that the class of real numbers with primi-
tive recursive Dedekind cuts is strictly included in the class of real numbers
with primitive recursive decimal expansions, and the fact that the latter class
is strictly included in the class of real numbers with primitive recursive Cauchy
approximation. He also studied arithmetic properties of these classes of real
numbers.
Soon after Specker published his paper, Rosza Pe´ter included Specker’s dis-
cussion of the different classes of primitive recursive real numbers in her book,
Rekursive Funktionen [173]. In a review of that book [184], Raphael M. Robin-
son noted that all the representations of real numbers mentioned above yield
the same class of numbers if one uses computability in place of primitive recur-
siveness. However, this is no longer true if one moves from single real numbers
to sequences of real numbers. Mostowski [161] proved that for computable se-
quences of real numbers the analogous strict inclusions hold, as they were proved
by Specker for single primitive recursive real numbers: the class of sequences of
real numbers with uniformly decidable Dedekind cuts is strictly included in the
class of sequences of real numbers with uniformly computable decimal expan-
sion, which in turn is strictly included in the class of sequences of real numbers
with computable Cauchy approximations. Mostowski pointed out that the strik-
ing coincidence between the behavior of classes of single primitive recursive real
numbers and computable sequences of real numbers is not very well understood:
It remains an open problem whether this is a coincidence or a special
case of a general phenomenon whose cause ought to be discovered.
A few years after Specker and Robinson, the logician H. Gordon Rice [183]
proved what Borel had already observed informally, namely that equality is
not decidable for computable real numbers. In contrast, whether a < b or
a > b holds can be decided for two non-equal computable real numbers a, b.
Rice also proved that the set Rc of computable real numbers forms a real alge-
braically closed field, and that the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem does not hold
computably, in the following sense: there is a bounded c.e. set of computable
numbers without a computable accumulation point. Kreisel wrote a review of
Rice’s paper for the Mathematical Reviews and pointed out that he had already
proved results that are more general than Rice’s; namely, he proved that any
power series with a computable sequence of coefficients (that are not all identi-
cal to zero) has only computable zeros in its interval of convergence [121], and
that there exists a computable bounded set of rational numbers which contains
no computable subsequence with a computable modulus of convergence [120].
In a second paper on computable analysis [202], Specker constructed a com-
putable real function that attains its maximum in the unit interval at a non-
computable number. In a footnote he mentioned that this solves an open prob-
lem posed by Grzegorczyk [82], a problem that Lacombe had already solved
independently [137]. Specker mentioned that a similar result can be derived
from a theorem of Zaslavski˘ı [239]. He also mentioned that the Intermediate
Value Theorem has a (non-uniform) computable version, but that it fails for
sequences of functions.
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2.5 Computable analysis in Poland and France
In the 1950’s, computable analysis received a substantial number of contribu-
tions from Andrzej Grzegorczyk [82, 83, 84, 85] in Poland and Daniel Lacombe
[82, 83, 84, 85, 124, 122, 123, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143] in France.
Grzegorczyk is the best known representative of the Polish school of computable
analysis, a school of research that came into being soon after Turing published
his seminal paper. Apparently, members of the Polish school of functional anal-
ysis became interested in questions of computability, and Stefan Banach and
Stanis law Mazur gave a seminar talk on this topic in Lviv (now in Ukraine, at
that time Polish) on January 23, 1937 [11]. Unfortunately, the second world
war got in the way, and Mazur’s course notes on computable analysis (edited
by Grzegorczyk and Rasiowa) where not published until much later [154].
Banach and Mazur’s notion of computability for functions on the real num-
bers was defined using computable sequences. Accordingly, we call a function
f : Rc → Rc Banach-Mazur computable if it maps computable sequences to
computable sequences. While this concept works well for well-behaved func-
tions (see, for example, the discussion of Pour-El and Richards’ work on linear
functions in Section 2.6), it yields a weaker concept of computability of real
number functions in general, as proved later by Aberth (again, see Section 2.6).
One of Mazur’s theorems was that every Banach-Mazur computable function
is already continuous on the computable reals. This theorem can be seen as a
forerunner and even as a stronger version of a theorem of Kreisel, Lacombe, and
Shoenfield [123], which was independently proved in slightly different versions
by Ce˘ıtin [36] and later by Moschovakis [160]. Essentially, the theorem says
that every real number function that is computable in the sense of Markov is
continuous (on the computable reals). (In this particular case one even has the
stronger conclusion that the function is effectively continuous. See Figure 5 in
Section 2.9.)
Grzegorczyk’s work [84] was mostly concerned with computable functions
f : [0, 1] → R on all real numbers of the unit interval and he proved a number
of equivalent characterizations of this concept. For instance f is computable if
and only if each of the following conditions hold:
1. f maps computable sequences to computable sequences and it has a com-
putable modulus of uniform convergence,
2. f can be represented by a computable function h on rational intervals
that is monotone with respect to inclusion and that approximates f in the
sense that {f(x)} =
⋂
{h(I) : x ∈ I} for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Later on, the first characterization became the basic definition of computability
used by Pour-El and Richards (see section 2.6), whereas the second characteriza-
tion is the starting point for domain theoretic characterizations of computability
[196, 54].
Lacombe’s pioneering work opened up two research directions in computable
analysis which were to play an important role. First, he initiated the study of
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c.e. open sets of reals, which are open sets that can be effectively obtained
as unions of rational intervals [139]. Together with Kreisel, Lacombe proved
that there are c.e. open sets that contain all computable reals and that have
arbitrarily small Lebesgue measure [124]. Secondly, Lacombe anticipated the
study of computability on more abstract spaces than Euclidean space, and was
one of the first to define the notion of a computable metric space [143].
2.6 Computable analysis in North America
More comprehensive approaches to computable analysis were developed in the
United States during the 1970’s and 1980’s. One stream of results is due to
Oliver Aberth, and is accumulated in his book, Computable Analysis [2]. His
work is built on Markov’s notion of computability for real number functions. We
call a function f : Rc → Rc on computable reals Markov computable if there is
an algorithm that transforms algorithms that describe inputs x into algorithms
that describe outputs f(x). Among other results, Aberth provided an example
of a Markov computable function f : Rc → Rc that cannot be extended to a
computable function on all real numbers [2, Theorem 7.3]. Such a function f
can, for instance, be constructed with a Specker sequence (xn), which is a com-
putable monotone increasing bounded sequence of real numbers that converges
to a non-computable real x. Using effectively inseparable sets, such a Specker
sequence can even be constructed so that it is effectively bounded away from
any computable point (see, for instance, the Effective Modulus Lemma in [176]).
One can use such a special Specker sequence and place increasingly steeper peaks
on each xn, as in Figure 1. If adjusted appropriately, this construction leads
x0 x1 x2 x
✲· · ·
Figure 1: Construction of a function f : R→ R
to a Markov computable function f : Rc → Rc that cannot be extended to a
computable function on the whole of R. In fact, it cannot even be extended
to a continuous function on R, since the peaks accumulate at x. Pour-El and
Richards [176, Theorem 6, page 67] later refined this counterexample to obtain
a differentiable, non-computable function f : R → R whose restriction to the
computable reals Rc is Markov computable. This can be achieved by replacing
the peaks in Aberth’s construction by smoother peaks of decreasing height.
Another well-known counterexample due to Aberth [1] is the construction of
a function F : R2c → Rc that is Markov computable and uniformly continuous
on a rectangle centered around the origin, with the property that the differential
equation
y′(x) = f(x, y(x))
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with initial condition y(0) = 0 has no computable solution y, not even on an
arbitrarily small interval around the origin. This result can be extended to
computable functions f : R2 → R, which was proved somewhat later by Pour-
El and Richards [177]. It can be interpreted as saying that the Peano Existence
Theorem does not hold computably.
Marian Pour-El and J. Ian Richards’ approach to computable analysis was
the dominant approach in the 1980’s, and is nicely presented in their book [176].
The basic idea is to axiomatize computability structures on Banach spaces using
computable sequences and a characterization of computability that is derived
from Grzegorczyk’s first characterization, which was mentioned in section 2.5.
This approach is tailor-made for well-behaved maps such as linear ones. One
of their central results is their First Main Theorem [179], which states that a
linear map T : X → Y on computable Banach spaces is computable if and only
if it is continuous and has a c.e. closed graph, i.e.
T computable ⇐⇒ T continuous and graph(T ) c.e. closed.
Moreover, the theorem states that a linear function T with a c.e. closed graph
satisfies
T computable ⇐⇒ T maps computable inputs to computable outputs.
Here a closed set is called c.e. closed if it contains a computable dense sequence.
The crucial assumption that the graph(T ) is c.e. closed has sometimes been
ignored tacitly in presentations of this theorem and this has created the wrong
impression that the theorem identifies computability with continuity. In any
case, the theorem is an important tool and provides many interesting coun-
terexamples. This is because the contrapositive version of the theorem implies
that every linear discontinuous T with a c.e. closed graph maps some computable
input to a non-computable output. For instance, the operator of differentiation
d :⊆ C[0, 1]→ C[0, 1], f 7→ f ′
is known to be linear and discontinuous and it is easily seen to have a c.e. closed
graph (for instance the rational polynomials are easily differentiated) and hence
it follows that there is a computable and continuously differentiable real number
function f : [0, 1] → R whose derivative f ′ is not computable. This is a fact
that has also been proved directly by Myhill [163].
The First Main Theorem is applicable to many other operators that arise
naturally in physics, such as the wave operator [178, 175]. In particular, it
follows that there is a computable wave (x, y, z) 7→ u(x, y, z, 0) that transform
into a non-computable wave (x, y, z) 7→ u(x, y, z, 1) if it evolves for one time
unit according to the wave equation
∂2u
∂x2
+
∂2u
∂y2
+
∂2u
∂z2
−
∂2u
∂t2
= 0
from initial condition ∂u
∂t
= 0. This result has occasionally been interpreted
as suggesting that it might be possible to build a wave computer that would
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violate Church’s Thesis. However, a physically more appropriate analysis shows
that this is not plausible (see Section 2.7 and also [172]). Pour-El and Richards’
definitions and concepts regarding Banach spaces have been transferred to the
more general setting of metric spaces by Yasugi, Mori and Tsujii [235] in Japan.
Another stream of research on computable analysis in the United States came
from Anil Nerode and his students and collaborators. For instance, Metakides,
Nerode and Shore proved that the Hahn-Banach Theorem is not computably
valid, but admits a non-uniform computable solution in the finite dimensional
case [157, 158]. Joseph S. Miller studied sets that appear as the set of fixed points
of a computable self map of the unit ball in Euclidean space [159]. Among other
things he proved that a closed set A ⊆ [0, 1]n is the set of fixed points of a com-
putable function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n if and only if it is co-c.e. closed and has
a co-c.e. closed connectedness component. Zhou also studied computable open
and closed sets on Euclidean space [242]. In a series of papers [103, 104, 102],
Kalantari and Welch provided results that shed further light on the relation be-
tween Markov computable functions and computable functions. Douglas Cenzer
and Jeffrey B. Remmel have studied the complexity of index sets for problems
in analysis [37, 38, 39]. McNicholl and his co-authors have started a study of
computable complex analysis [156, 155, 152, 153].
It is possible to study computable functions of analysis from the point of
view of computational complexity. We cannot discuss such results in detail
here, but in passing we mention the important work of Harvey Friedman and
Ker-I Ko [113, 114, 115, 117, 64, 118], which is well summarized in [116]; and,
more recently, interesting work of Mark Braverman, Stephen Cook and Akitoshi
Kawamura [28, 27, 29, 105, 106]. Braverman and Michael Yampolsky have
recently written a nice monograph on computability properties of Julia sets
[30].
2.7 Computable analysis in Germany
In Eastern Germany, Ju¨rgen Hauck produced a sequence of interesting papers on
computable analysis that were only published in German [86, 87, 88], building
on the work of Dieter Klaua [107, 108]. The novel aspect of Hauck’s work is that
he studied the notion of a representation (of real numbers or other objects) in
its own right. This aspect has been taken up in the work of Weihrauch’s school
of computable analysis [224], which has its origins in the work of Christoph
Kreitz and Klaus Weihrauch [125, 126, 226, 222]. Kreitz and Weihrauch began
to develop a systematic theory of representations that is centered around the
notion of an admissible representation. Representations δX :⊆ N
N → X are
(potentially partial) maps that are surjective. Admissible representations δX are
particularly well-behaved with respect to some topology given on the represented
set X . If δX and δY are admissible representations of topological spaces X and
Y , respectively, then a (partial) function f :⊆ X → Y is continuous if and only
if there exists a continuous F :⊆ NN → NN on Baire space NN such that the
diagram in Figure 2 commutes.
The perspective arising from the concept of a representation as a map sheds
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N ✲
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δYδX
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Y
❄
Figure 2: Notions of computable real number functions
new light on representations of real numbers as they were studied earlier by
Specker, Mostowski and others. Their results can be developed in a more
uniform way, using the concept of computable reducibility for representations,
which yields a lattice of real number representations. The position of a repre-
sentation in this lattice characterizes the finitely accessible information content
of the respective representation, see Figure 3. In particular, the behavior of
representations that was mysterious to Mostowski can be explained naturally in
this way.
Continued fraction representation
Characteristic functionsCharacteristic functions
Representation ρb for basis b
Cauchy representation ρ ≡ ρ< ⊓ ρ>
EnumerationEnumeration
Naive Cauchy representation
of left cuts of right cuts
of right cutsof left cuts
ρ>ρ<
✘✘✿
❳❳② ✘✘✿
❳❳②
✘✘✿
❳❳② ✘✘✿
❳❳②
✻
Figure 3: The lattice of real number representations
The concept of an admissible representation has been extended to a larger
classes of topological spaces by the work of Matthias Schro¨der [193]. In his
definition, an admissible representation with respect to a certain topology on
the represented space is just one that is maximal among all continuous repre-
sentations with respect to computable reducibility. Hence, admissibility can be
seen as a completeness property.
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Many other interesting results have been developed using the concept of
a representation (see, for instance, the tutorial [25] for a more detailed sur-
vey). For instance, Peter Hertling [91] proved that the real number structure
is computably categorical in the sense that up to computable equivalence there
is one and only one representation that makes all the ingredients of the struc-
ture computable. He also studied a computable version of Riemann’s Mapping
Theorem [90], and proved that the Hyperbolicity Conjecture implies that the
Mandelbrot set M ⊆ R2 is computable in the sense that its distance function is
computable. Finally, he also proved that there is a Banach-Mazur computable
function f : Rc → Rc that is not Markov computable [92].
Matthias Schro¨der and Klaus Weihrauch have studied a very general setting
for computational complexity in analysis using proper representations [190, 225,
194] and Schro¨der has also studied online complexity of real number functions
[191, 192], following earlier work of Scho¨nhage [189]. Robert Rettinger and
Klaus Weihrauch studied the computational complexity of Julia sets [180]. In
another interesting stream of papers weaker notions of computability on real
numbers were studied [240, 181, 182] by Xizhong Zheng, Klaus Weihrauch and
Robert Rettinger.
Ning Zhong and Klaus Weihrauch studied computability of distributions
[241] and proved computability of the solution operator of several partial dif-
ferential equations [227, 228, 229, 230, 231]. In particular, they revised the the
wave equation and proved that if this equation is treated in physically realistic
spaces, then it turns out to be computable [227].
Martin Ziegler has studied models of hypercomputation and related notions
of computability for discontinuous functions [243]. Martin Ziegler and Ste´phane
Le Roux have revisited co-c.e. closed sets. Among other things, they proved that
the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem is not limit computable, in the sense that there
is a computable sequence in the unit cube without a limit computable cluster
point [144]. Baigger [10] proved that the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem has
a computable counterexample (essentially following Orevkov’s ideas [167], who
proved the corresponding result for Markov computability much earlier).
Just as the computational content of representations of real numbers can
be analyzed in a lattice, there is another lattice that allows one to classify
the computational content of (forall-exists) theorems. This lattice is based
on a computable reduction for functions that has been introduced by Klaus
Weihrauch and that has recently been studied more intensively by Arno Pauly,
Guido Gherardi, Alberto Marcone, Brattka, and others [171, 23, 21]. Theorems
such as the Hahn-Banach Theorem [73], the Baire Category Theorem, the In-
termediate Value Theorem [22], the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem [24] and the
Radon-Nikodym Theorem [100] have been classified in this lattice as well as
finding Nash equilibria or solving linear equations [170]. Figure 4 shows the
respective relative positions of these theorems in the Weihrauch lattice. This
classification yields a uniform perspective on the computational content of all
these theorems, and the position of a theorem in this lattice fully characterizes
certain properties of the respective theorem regarding computability. In partic-
ular, it implies all aforementioned computability properties of these theorems.
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Baire Category TheoremWeak Ko˝nig’s Lemma
computable
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Intermediate Value Theorem
Banach’s Inverse Mapping
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Figure 4: The computational content of theorems in the Weihrauch lattice
2.8 Computable measure theory
The field of algorithmic randomness relies on effective notions of measure and
measurable set. Historically, debates in the 1930’s as to how to make sense of the
notion of a “random” sequence of coin flips gave rise to the Kolmogorov axioms
for a probability space, and the measure-theoretic interpretation of probability.
On that interpretation, the statement that a “random” element of a space has
a certain property should be interpreted as the statement that the set of coun-
terexamples has measure 0. In that framework, talk of random elements is only
a manner of speaking; there is no truly “random” sequence of coin flips x, since
each such element is contained in the null set {x}.
In the 1960’s, Per Martin-Lo¨f, a student of Kolmogorov, revived the no-
tion of a random sequence of coin flips [149, 150]. The idea is that, from a
computability-theoretic perspective, it makes sense to call a sequence random
if it avoids all suitably effective null sets. For example, a Martin-Lo¨f test is an
effectively null Gδ set, which is to say, an effective sequence of computably open
sets Gi with the property that for each i, the Lebesgue measure of Gi is less
than 2−i. An sequence of coin flips fails such a test if it is in the intersection of
the sets Gi. An element of the unit interval is said to be Martin-Lo¨f random if
it does not fail any such test. Osvald Demuth [48] defined an equivalent notion,
independently, in 1975.
Martin-Lo¨f randomness can be given alternate characterizations in terms of
computable betting strategies, or in terms of information content. There are
by now many other notions of randomness in the literature. One, based on the
influential work of C.-P. Schnorr [188, 187], is similar to Martin-Lo¨f randomness
but requires that, moreover, the measures of the open sets Gi are uniformly
computable. It is impossible to even begin to survey this very active area here,
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but detailed overviews can be found in the monographs [165, 50]. Kucˇera and
Nies [135] provides a nice discussion of Demuth’s contributions to the subject.
Measure theory, more generally, has been studied from a computability-
theoretic perspective. Most work in algorithmic randomness has focused on
random elements of 2N, or, equivalently, random elements of the unit inter-
val [0, 1]. But there are a number of ways of developing the notion of a com-
putable measure on more general spaces; see the work of Ga´cs [66], Hertling and
Weihrauch [93] and Hoyrup and Rojas [98]. Weihrauch [223] and Schro¨der [195]
have discussed different representations of probability measures and Weihrauch
and Wu [234] have further developed the foundations of computable measure
theory. Edalat [53] has studied computable measure and integration theory
from the perspective of domain theory. Bosserhoff [20] and Hoyrup and Ro-
jas [98] have defined various notions of computability for measurable functions.
This makes it possible to consider results in measure theory, probability, and
dynamical systems in computability-theoretic terms.
For example, computable aspects of the ergodic theorems have been stud-
ied extensively. The pointwise and mean ergodic theorems assert that if T is
a measure-preserving transformation of a finite measure space and f is any
measurable function, then the ergodic averages Anf =
1
n
∑
i<n f ◦ T
i converge
pointwise, and in the L2 norm, respectively. V’yugin [220, 221] and, indepen-
dently, Avigad and Simic [9, 197, 5] have shown that the mean and pointwise
ergodic theorems do not hold computably, but Avigad, Gerhardy, and Townser
[8] have shown that a rate of convergence can be computed from T , f , and
the norm of the limit. In particular, the rate of convergence can be computed
from T and f when the transformation is ergodic. V’yugin [220, 221] has shown
that if T is a measurable transformation of the unit interval and f is a com-
putable function, then the sequence of ergodic averages (Anf) converges on
every Martin-Lo¨f random real. Franklin and Towsner [60] have recently shown
that this is sharp. Hoyrup and Rojas [69] have generalized V’yugin’s result to
computable measurable functions. Indeed, the work of Ga´cs, Galatolo, Hoyrup,
and Rojas [68, 67], together with the results of [8], shows that the Schnorr ran-
dom reals are exactly the ones at which the ergodic theorem holds with respect
to every ergodic measure and computable measure-preserving transformation
(see also the discussion in [166]). Bienvenu, Day, Hoyrup, and Shen [15] and,
independently, Franklin, Greenberg, Miller, and Ng [59] have extended V’yugin’s
result to the characteristic function of a computably open set, in the case where
the measure is ergodic.
Other theorems of measure-theory and measure-theoretic probability have
been considered in this vein. (Such work is, to some extent, foreshadowed by
the study of measure theory in the context of reverse mathematics, by Simpson,
Yu, and others; see, for example, [238, 236, 237].) The Lebesgue differentiation
theorem states, roughly speaking, that for almost every point of Rn, the value of
an integrable function at that point is equal to the limit of increasingly small av-
erages taken around that point. Pathak [169] showed that, when the integrable
function is computable in an appropriate sense, the theorem is true at every
Martin-Lo¨f random point. Pathak, Rojas, and Simpson [166] later strengthened
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the conclusion to the Schnorr-random real numbers, and showed that this is
sharp; this same result was obtained independently by Rute [186]. Another the-
orem of Lebesgue’s states that a function of bounded variation is differentiable
almost everywhere. Recasting results of Demuth [49], Brattka, Miller, and Nies
[26] have shown that when the function in question is computable, the result
holds at Martin-Lo¨f random real numbers, and that this is sharp. Moreover,
they obtained clean characterizations of other notions of randomness in terms
of differentiability. Freer, Kjos-Hansen, Nies, and Stephan [61] have obtained
similar results for the class of Lipschitz functions. Rute [186] has considered a
number of differentiability and martingale convergence theorems, characterizing
the points at which the theorems hold, and determining when rates of conver-
gence are and are not computable. Ackerman, Freer, and Roy have studied the
computability of conditional distributions [3], Hoyrup, Rojas, and Weihrauch
have studied the computability of Radon-Nikodym derivatives [99], and Freer
and Roy have provided a computable version of de Finetti’s theorem [62].
2.9 Appendix: Notions of computability for real number
functions
In this appendix, we summarize the various notions of computability for real
number functions that were discussed in previous sections, and we briefly indi-
cate the logical relations between these notions. For simplicity we restrict the
discussion to functions that are total on all real numbers or on all computable
real numbers.
A rapidly converging Cauchy name for a real number x is a sequence (xi)i∈N
of rationals that converges to x rapidly, i.e. in such a way that for every i and
j ≥ i, |xj − xi| < 2
−i. (Any other computable rate of convergence would work
equally well.)
1. f : R → R is called computable if there is an algorithm that transforms
each given rapidly converging Cauchy name of an arbitrary x into such a
name for f(x) (on a Turing machine with one-way output tape).
2. f : Rc → Rc is called Borel computable if f is computable in the previously
described sense, but restricted to computable reals.
3. f : Rc → Rc is called Markov computable if there is an algorithm that
converts each given algorithm for a computable real x into an algorithm
for f(x). Here an algorithm for a computable real number x produces a
rapidly converging Cauchy name for x as output.
4. f : Rc → Rc is called Banach-Mazur computable if f maps any given
computable sequence (xn) of real numbers into a computable sequence
(f(xn)) of real numbers.
The diagram in Figure 5 summarizes the logical relations between different
notions of computability. Some of these equivalences can be generalized to
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partial functions with well-behaved domains, and to other computable metric
spaces (see [89, 92]).
f : R → R computable f : Rc → Rc Borel computable
f : Rc → Rc Markov computable
f : Rc → Rc Banach-Mazur computable
f : Rc → Rc continuousf : R → R continuous
◆
▼
q
q
②
②
❲
❲
❲
❖
❖
❖
by restriction
by restriction
not always extendible
not always extendible,
examples by Aberth and
Pour-El & Richards
Theorem of Ce˘ıtin and
Kreisel-Lacombe-Shoenfield
example by Hertling
Theorem of Mazur
Figure 5: Notions of computable real number functions
3 Constructive analysis
As noted in Section 1, the growing divergence of conceptual and computational
concerns in the early twentieth century left the mathematical community with
two choices: either restrict mathematical language and methods to preserve
direct computational meaning, or allow more expansive language and methods
and find a place for computational mathematics within it. We have seen how the
theory of computability has supported the latter option: given broad notions of
real number, function, space, and so on, we can now say, in precise mathematical
terms, which real numbers, functions, and spaces are computable.
There is still, however, a community of mathematicians that favors the first
option, namely, adopting a “constructive” style of mathematics, whereby theo-
rems maintain a direct computational interpretation. This simplifies language:
rather than say “there exists a computable function f” one can say “there exists
a function f ,” with the general understanding that, from a constructive stand-
point, proving the existence of such a function requires providing an algorithm
to compute it. Similarly, rather than say “there is an algorithm which, given x,
computes y such that . . . ,” one can say “given x, there exists y such that . . . ”
with the general understanding that a constructive proof, by its very nature,
provides such an algorithm.
In sum, from a constructive point of view, all existence claims are expected to
have computational significance. We will see, however, that this general stricture
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is subject to interpretation, especially when it comes to infinitary mathematical
objects. Today there are many different “flavors” of constructive mathematics,
with varying norms and computational interpretations. Here the methods of
logic and computability theory prove to be useful yet again: once we design a
formal deductive system that reasonably captures a style of constructive rea-
soning, we can provide a precise computational semantics. This serves to clarify
the sense in which a style of constructive mathematics has computational sig-
nificance, and helps bridge the two approaches to preserving computational
meaning.
This section will provide a brief historical overview of a some of the differ-
ent approaches to constructive mathematics, as well as some associated formal
axiomatic systems and their computational semantics. Troelstra and van Dalen
[207] and Beeson [14] provide more thorough introductions to these topics.
3.1 Kroneckerian mathematics
In 1887, facing the rising Dedekind-Cantor revolution, the mathematician Leopold
Kronecker wrote an essay in which he urged the mathematical community to
maintain focus on symbolic and algorithmic aspects of mathematics.
[A]ll the results of the profoundest mathematical research must in
the end be expressible in the simple forms of the properties of in-
tegers. But to let these forms appear simply, one needs above all
a suitable, surveyable manner of expression and representation for
the numbers themselves. The human spirit has been working on this
project persistently and laboriously since the greyest prehistory. . . .
([130, page 955])
One gets a better sense of Kronecker’s views by considering the way they played
out in his work, such as his treatment of algebraic numbers in his landmark
Grundzu¨ge einer arithmetischen Theorie der algebraischen Gro¨ssen [128], or in
his treatment of the fundamental theorem of algebra in Ein Fundamentalsatz
der allgemeinen Arithmetik [129]. In general, Kronecker avoided speaking of
“arbitrary” real numbers and functions, and, rather, dealt with algebraic sys-
tems of such things, wherein the objects are given by symbolic expressions, and
operations on the objects are described in terms of symbolic calculations. Of
course, it is still an important task to understand how rational approximations
can be obtained from an algebraic description of a real number. But even when
dealing with convergent sequences and limits (as in, for example, the proof
of Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in an arithmetic progression in his lectures
on number theory), Kronecker always provided explicit information as to how
quickly a sequence converges. The approach is nicely described by his student
Hensel:
He believed that one can and must in this domain formulate each
definition in such a way that its applicability to a given quantity can
be assessed by means of a finite number of tests. Likewise that an
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existence proof for a quantity is to be regarded as entirely rigorous
only if it contains a method by which that quantity can really be
found. ([131], quoted in Stein [203, p. 250].)
A number of articles by Harold Edwards (including [55, 56, 57]) provide an
excellent overview of Kronecker’s outlook and contributions to mathematics.
3.2 Brouwerian intuitionism
During the 1910’s, the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer advanced a new
philosophy of mathematics, intuitionism, which made strong pronouncements
as to the appropriate methods of mathematical reasoning. Brouwer held that
mathematical objects are constructions of the mind, and that we come to know
a mathematical theorem only by carrying out a mental construction that enables
us to see that it is true. In particular, seeing that a statement of the form A∧B
is true involves seeing that A is true, and that B is true; seeing that A → B
is true involves having a mental procedure that transforms any construction
witnessing the truth of A to a construction witnessing the truth of B; seeing
that ¬A is true involves having a procedure that transforms a construction
witnessing the truth of A to a contradiction (that is, something which, evidently,
cannot be the case); and seeing that A ∨ B is true requires carrying out a
mental construction enabling one to see that A is true, or carrying out a mental
construction to see that B is true; and similarly for statements involving the
universal and existential quantifiers. This account, developed further by Heyting
and Kolmogorov, has come to be known as the BHK interpretation. It is not
hard to see that, according to this interpretation, the law of the excluded middle,
A ∨ ¬A, does not generally hold. For example, if A is the statement of the
Goldbach conjecture, then we cannot presently assert A ∨ ¬A, because we do
not currently know that the Goldbach conjecture is true, nor do we know that
it is false.
There is a strong solopsistic strand to Brouwer’s philosophy, in that the
mathematical knowledge one has is a reflection of one’s inner mental life, inde-
pendent of an external world or other thinkers. He also held that mathematical
knowledge and thought are independent of language, which he took to be a
deeply limited and flawed means of communicating mathematical ideas. Intu-
itionism may seem to have little to do with computation per se, but, as we will
see below, if one replaces Brouwer’s mental constructions and procedures with
symbolic representations and algorithms, one is left with an essentially compu-
tational view of mathematics. Thus, Brouwer’s mathematical ideas have proved
to be influential in computer science, despite the different motivations.
Brouwer was also an influential topologist, and an important part of his
intuitionist program was to develop an intuitionistically appropriate foundation
for reasoning about the continuum [32, 33]. To that end, he introduced the
notion of a choice sequence, that is, an “arbitrary” sequence of natural numbers.
Some choice sequences are generated by a law, such as the sequence 0, 0, 0, . . ..
At the other extreme, some sequences are “lawless,” that is, generated by events
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that are not predetermined. Brouwer introduced the continuity principle, which,
roughly speaking, asserts that any function from choice sequences to the natural
numbers is continuous; in other words, the value of the function at a given choice
sequence depends only on a finite initial segment of that sequence. (See Troelstra
and van Dalen [207, I.4.6] for a precise formulation.)
Brouwer went on to develop an intuitionistic set theory based on such se-
quences. A spread, in his terminology, is a tree on N such that each node has at
least one successor. Brouwer saw this data as a way of specifying a collection of
choice sequences; that is, a choice sequence is in the spread if and only if every
initial segment is in the tree. A fan is a spread with the property that every
node has only finitely many successors. At the risk of clouding some intuitions,
we can translate these notions to classical terms: a choice sequence is an ar-
bitrary element of Baire space (the space of functions from N to N under the
product topology), a spread corresponds to a closed subset of Baire space, and
a fan corresponds to a compact subset of Baire space.
In 1927, Brouwer [34] introduced the bar theorem, which, despite the name,
is essentially an axiomatic principle that provides transfinite induction on well-
founded trees on N. Roughly speaking, it asserts that any property that holds
outside and at the leaves of such a well-founded tree, and is preserved in passing
from all the children of a node to the node itself, holds of every finite sequence.
An immediate corollary is the fan theorem, which asserts that a well-founded fan
is finite. Using the fan theorem and the continuity principle, Brouwer showed
that every function from [0, 1] to R is uniformly continuous. When properties
of choice sequences are understood in terms of computable predicates on Baire
space, this formulation of analysis accords quite well with Grzegorczyk’s notion
of computability, as discussed in Section 2.5.
For more information on intuitionistic mathematics, see [52, 94, 207, 31].
For more on Brouwer and his philosophical views, see [216, 217].
3.3 Early formal systems for constructive mathematics
Now let us consider some formal axiomatic systems that capture such construc-
tive styles of reasoning. A theory now known as primitive recursive arithmetic
was designed by Thoralf Skolem [199] to capture Hilbert’s notion of “finitary”
mathematical reasoning. In its strictest form, the theory has variables ranging
over the natural numbers, but no quantifiers. One starts with some basic func-
tions on the natural numbers, and is allowed to define new functions using a
schema of primitive recursion:
• f(0, z1, . . . , zn) = g(z1, . . . , zn), and
• f(x+ 1, z1, . . . , zn) = h(x, f(x, z1, . . . , zn), z1, . . . , zn),
where g and h have previously been defined. Although this schema may seem
limited, with ingenuity one can show that almost any reasonable function (and
hence relation) on the natural numbers is primitive recursive. In particular,
the primitive recursive relations are closed under bounded quantification. As a
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result, primitive recursive arithmetic can be viewed as a reasonable framework
in which to carry out a Kroneckarian constructivism.
Indeed, primitive recursive arithmetic is often taken as a starting point for
formalizing basic mathematical notions in many presentations of formal ax-
iomatic foundations for mathematics, classical or constructive. It plays a cen-
tral role in Hilbert and Bernays’ landmark Grundlagen der Mathematik [96],
in Kleene’s Introduction to Metamathematics [111], and Goodstein’s Recursive
Number Theory [79]. Goodstein’s later Recursive Analysis [80] develops topics
like integration and differentiation on the basis of primitive recursive arithmetic.
Today, finitism is viewed as an extreme form of intuitionism. Foundational
writings in the 1920’s, however, do not show a clear distinction between the two.
Indeed, as late as 1930, von Neumann used the two terms interchangeably in his
exposition of formalism [219] at the Second Conference for Epistemology and
the Exact Sciences in Ko¨nigsberg. (This was, incidentally, the meeting where
Go¨del announced the first incompleteness theorem.)
The situation was clarified when Arend Heyting, a student of Brouwer’s, pro-
vided formal axiomatizations of intuitionistic mathematics, despite Brouwer’s
antipathy towards formalization. Specifically, he provided formal treatments of
intuitionistic logic, arithmetic, and Brouwer’s theory of choice sequences, which
appeared in a series of three papers published in 1930 [95]. In 1933, Go¨del [76],
and later Gentzen [70], showed that classical first-order arithmetic could be in-
terpreted in intuitionistic first-order arithmetic via what is now known as the
double-negation translation. At the time, classical first-order arithmetic, which
extends primitive recursive arithmetic with quantifiers ranging over the natural
numbers and induction for all formulas in the language, was viewed as strictly
stronger than finitism. The interpretation of classical arithmetic in intuitionis-
tic arithmetic thereby prompted the realization that intuitionism and finitism
diverge as well.
3.4 Realizability
The developments described in this section so far all predate Turing’s analysis of
computability. Once notions of computability were in place, however, it was not
long before Stephen Kleene showed that they can be used to provide a precise
sense in which intuitionistic mathematics has a computational interpretation.
Towards the end of a paper [109] published in 1943, but first presented to the
American Mathematical Society in 1940, he put forth the following:
Thesis III. A proposition of the form (x)(Ey)A(x, y) containing no
free variables is provable constructively, only if there is a general
recursive function φ(x) such that (x)A(x, φ(x)). ([109, Section 16,
page 69])
One can turn this thesis into theorems by showing that the statement holds when
we replace “constructive provability” by provability in particular axiomatic sys-
tems. Kleene carried out this program over the next few years, together with
his student, David Nelson [110, 164]. For that purpose, Kleene introduced the
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notion of “realizability,” which is, roughly speaking, an analysis of the Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation in computability-theoretic terms. Specifi-
cally, Kleene defined a relation e realizes ϕ inductively, where e is a natural
number and ϕ is a sentence in the language of first-order arithmetic, with the
following clauses:
• If ϕ is atomic, then e realizes ϕ if and only if it is true.
• e realizes θ ∧ η if and only if e is of the form 2a3b, where a realizes θ and
b realizes η.
• e realizes θ ∨ η if and only if e is of the form 203a and a realizes θ, or e is
of the form 213b and b realizes η.
• e realizes θ → η if and only if e is the Go¨del number of a partial recursive
function f which, given any a realizing θ, returns a number f(a) realizing
η.
• e realizes ∃x θ(x) if and only if e is of the form 2x3a and a realizes θ(x¯),
where x¯ is the numeral that denotes x.
• e realizes ∀x θ(x) if and only if e is the Go¨del number of a partial recursive
function f which, given any x, returns a number f(x) realizing θ(x¯).
More generally, if ϕ has free variables, e realizes ϕ if and only if it realizes its
universal closure. A formula ϕ is said to be realizable if there is some number
realizing it.
Kleene emphasized that this does not provide a reductive analysis of intu-
itionistic truth, insofar as quantifiers and logical connectives themselves appear
in the definition. In particular, if ϕ is a true, purely universal sentence, then
anything realizes ϕ; and a realizer for a negated sentence carries no useful in-
formation at all. However, for any sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic, the
statement “e realizes ϕ” can also be expressed in the language of arithmetic,
and one can inquire as to how these two assertions are related to one another.
Nelson showed that if intuitionistic logic proves ϕ, then it proves that ϕ is real-
izable. Unfortunately, it is not the case that for any ϕ, intuitionistic arithmetic
proves that ϕ is equivalent to its own realizability; but Nelson showed that in-
tuitionistic arithmetic does prove that this equivalence is realizable. Moreover,
one can strengthen the clause for implication:
• e realizes θ → η if and only if θ implies η and e is the Go¨del number
of a partial recursive function f which, given any a realizing θ, returns a
number f(a) realizing η.
In that case, intuitionistic arithmetic proves that a formula ϕ is true if and only
if it is realizable.
The idea that a constructive proof provides explicit “evidence” for the truth
of a theorem in question, and that such evidence can often be described in
computability-theoretic terms, is a powerful one. It can help illuminate the
27
“meaning” or “computational content” of a formal axiomatic system; and, as a
purely technical device, it can be used to obtain metamathematical properties
of such systems, such as provability and unprovability results. In 1967, Kleene
and Vesley [112] presented a formalization of Brouwerian analysis together with
a suitable realizability interpretation.
By now, there is a bewildering array of realizability relations in the literature.
Variations can depend on any of the following features:
• the language expressing the mathematical assertions (first-order, second-
order, or higher-order, etc.);
• the kinds of realizers (arbitrary computable functions, computable func-
tions in a particular class, or a broader class of functions);
• the descriptions of the realizers (e.g. whether they are represented by
natural numbers, or terms in a formal language);
• whether or not the realizability relation itself is expressed in a formal
system; or
• the particular clauses of the realizability relation itself (see, for example,
the variant of the clause for implication above).
All these decisions have bearing on the axioms and rules that are realized,
and the metamathematical consequences once can draw. See Troelstra [206]
for a definitive reference, as well as [14, 205] for more information. Realizabil-
ity theory can also be used to translate results from constructive analysis into
computable analysis; see [12, 145].
3.5 The Russian school of constructive mathematics
The post-Turing era brought a new approach to constructive mathematics, the
principal tenets of which were set forth by A. A. Markov in the late 1940’s and
developed through the 1950’s [147, 148]. The result is what has come to be
known as the “Markov school” or “Russian school” of constructive mathemat-
ics, with contributions by Nikolai Shanin, I. Zaslavski˘ı, Gregory Ce˘ıtin, Osvald
Demuth, and Boris Kushner, among many others.6 Aspects of their work have
already been discussed above in connection with computable analysis. Indeed,
a hallmark of this style of constructivity is that it relies explicitly on notions
of computability, which is to say, the real numbers are explicitly defined to be
computable reals; the notion of a function from the natural numbers to the
natural numbers is explicitly defined to be a computable function; and so on.
In contrast to contemporary computable analysis, however, the Russian school
insisted that proofs also have a constructive character, so that, for example,
a proof of a statement of the form ∀x ∃y ϕ(x, y) statement can be seen to
yield a computable dependence of y on x. This style of constructivity can be
6A detailed bibliography can be found on the Computability and Complexity in Analysis
Network, http://cca-net.de/publications/.
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viewed as “constructive computable mathematics,” or “constructive recursive
mathematics,” and, indeed, is often referred to as such.
Note that this style of constructivity stands in stark contrast to Brouw-
erian intuitionism: even if Brouwer could have identified his “constructions”
with formal notions of computability, he would have been unlikely to do so.
The Russian school also adopted a principle that is not found in Brouwerian
intuitionism, namely, Markov’s principle. This states that if P is a decidable
property of natural numbers (that is, P (x)∨¬P (x) holds for every x), and it is
contradictory that no x satisfies P , then some x satisfies P . In symbols:
¬∀x ¬P (x)→ ∃xP (x).
The intuition is that one can find an x satisfying P (x) by simply searching for
it systematically, since the hypothesis guarantees that the search cannot fail to
turn up such an x.
One can find good overviews of this style of constructivity in books by Aberth
[2] and Kushner [133], as well as Kushner’s survey [134].
3.6 Theories of finite types
In constructive recursive mathematics, one can interpret functions as Turing-
machine indices, which can, in turn, be thought of as descriptions of a computer
program. Thus, in constructive recursive mathematics, sets and functions can
be “coded,” or represented, by natural numbers. But ordinary mathematics
deals not just with sets and functions of natural numbers, but also with sets
of sets, sets of functions, functionals defined on spaces of functions, and so
on. Rather than represent all of these using indices for computable objects, it
is more natural, for some purposes, to keep the computational interpretation
implicit, and take mathematical objects at face value.
To that end, it is convenient to adopt the language of finite types. The
idea traces back to foundational frameworks designed by Frege, Russell and
Whitehead, and Church, which will be discussed in Section 3.8. Roughly, a
“type” can be thought of as a syntactic classification of mathematical objects.
To obtain the finite types, start with the type N, intended to denote the natural
numbers, so that an object of type N is a natural number. Add the rule that
whenever A and B are finite types, so is A → B. Intuitively, an object of type
A→ B is a function from A to B. Thus, we can form the type N→ N of functions
from N to N, the type (N→ N)→ N of functionals from N→ N to N, and so on.
It is sometimes also convenient to add a base type Bool for the Boolean values
“true” and “false,” and product types A× B, but these are inessential.
Following Go¨del [77], we can extend the set of primitive recursive functions to
the set of primitive recursive functionals of finite type by extending the schema
of primitive recursion to the higher types. This provides a syntactic calculus for
defining objects of the various types, and Go¨del’s theory T provides a calculus
for reasoning about these objects.
There are then two ways of giving T a computational interpretation. The
first is to remain at the level of syntax: one provides an explicit procedure to
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“reduce” any term in the calculus to a canonical normal form (see Tait [204] and
Girard [75]). Thus if F is a term of type A → B, one can view F as denoting
the function which takes any term t, in normal form, and returns the normal
form corresponding to F (t).
A second approach, however, provides a more natural computational un-
derstanding of the finite types. For each type σ, define the set of hereditarily
recursive functions of type σ, HROσ, inductively as follows: the hereditarily
recursive functions of type N are simply the natural numbers, and the heredi-
tarily recursive functions of type A to B are those indices e such that for every
hereditarily recursive function x of type A, ϕe(x) is defined, and is a heredi-
tarily recursive function of type B. Thus the hereditarily recursive functions of
type N → N are (indices of) total computable functions; hereditarily recursive
functions of type (N→ N)→ N are computable functions which, for each total
computable function, return a number; and so on. It is then easy to interpret
each term of T as a hereditarily recursive functional.
In general, hereditarily recursive functions are not extensional: because func-
tions act on indices, it can happen that two indices e and e′ compute the same
function from N to N, and yet F (e) 6= F (e′) for some hereditarily recursive
functional F . One can repair this by inductively defining extensional equality
between functionals, and insisting that the interpretations of the function types
preserve this equality. The resulting set of functionals is then called the heredi-
tarily effective operations, HEO. This is an instance of what computer scientists
refer to as a PER model, since for each σ, HEOσ is given by a partial equiva-
lence relation, which is to say, an equivalence relation on a subset of the natural
numbers.
One obtains the finite type extensions HAω of Heyting arithmetic by ex-
tending T with quantifiers and induction over arbitrary finite types. Go¨del’s
Dialectica interpretation provides an interpretation of HAω in T . Alternatively,
one can show that provable formulas in HAω are realized by terms in T . Thus,
whenever HAω proves ∀x ∃y ϕ(x, y), where x and y are variables of any finite
type, there is a hereditarily effective operation which computes y from x. The
models HRO and HEO can be formalized in intuitionistic arithmetic, HA, show-
ing that HAω is also interpretable in first-order intuitionistic arithmetic. (For
discussions of HAω, T, and models thereof, see [7, 206, 207].)
3.7 Bishop-style constructive mathematics
In 1967, the American analyst, Errett Bishop, published a book, Foundations
of Constructive Analysis [16], which launched a new era in constructivity. In
the preface, he wrote:
It appears . . . that there are certain mathematical statements that
are merely evocative, which make assertions without empirical valid-
ity. There are also mathematical statements of immediate empirical
validity, which say that certain performable operations will produce
certain observable results, for instance, the theorem that every pos-
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itive integer is the sum of four squares. Mathematics is a mixture of
the real and the ideal, sometimes one, sometimes the other, often so
presented that it is hard to tell which is which. The realistic com-
ponent of mathematics—the desire for pragmatic interpretation—
supplies the control which determines the course of development
and keeps mathematics from lapsing into meaningless formalism.
The idealistic component permits simplifications and opens possi-
bilities which would otherwise be closed. The methods of proof and
objects of investigation have been idealized to form a game, but the
actual conduct of the game is ultimately motivated by pragmatic
considerations.
For 50 years now there have been no significant changes in the rules of
this game. Mathematicians unanimously agree on how mathematics
should be played. . .
This book is a piece of constructivist propaganda, designed to show
that there does exist a satisfactory alternative.
This was a landmark in the history of constructive mathematics. Brouwerian
intuitionism relied not only on a vocabulary that is foreign to most working
mathematicians, but also on principles, such as the continuity of every function
defined on [0, 1], that are not classically valid. Similarly, the Russian school’s
explicit restriction to computable objects sets it apart from contemporary math-
ematics. A central feature of Bishop’s constructive mathematics is that the
theorems are classically valid, and, indeed, look like ordinary mathematical the-
orems. The point, however, is that they are established in such a way that every
theorem has computational significance. This is achieved by stating definitions
and theorems carefully, restricting generality (“avoiding pseudogenerality,” in
Bishop’s words), and adhering to methods that retain computational meaning.
Foundations thus began with an informal statement of constructive set-
theoretic principles. To start with, “a sequence is a rule which associates to
each positive integer n a mathematical object an.” Then:
The totality of all mathematical objects constructed in accord with
certain requirements is called a set. The requirements of the con-
struction, which vary with the set under consideration, determine
that set. Thus the integers are a set, the rational numbers are a set,
and the collection of all sequences each of whose terms is an integer
is a set. Each set A will be endowed with a relation = of equality.
This relation is a matter of convention, except that it must be an
equivalence relation.
And, as far as functions are concerned:
The dependence of one quantity on another is expressed in the basic
notion of an operation. An operation from a set A to a set B is a
rule f which assigns an element f(a) of B to each element a of A.
The rule must afford an explicit, finite, mechanical reduction of the
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procedure for constructing f(a) to the procedure for constructing
a. . . The most important case occurs when
f(a1) = f(a2)
whenever a1 and a2 are equal elements of A. Such an operation f is
called a function.
Although Bishop did not provide a formal axiomatic foundation, it is reason-
able to seek a formal interpretation of this framework. One option is to use a
system like HAω, and interpret each set as a definable subset of a type with a
definable equivalence relation; that is, take the membership relation x ∈ A to
be given by a formula ϕA(x) and take equality x =A y to be given by another
formula ψ=A(x, y). The interpretations of HA
ω discussed in the last section
then give Bishop-style constructive mathematics a direct computational inter-
pretation. Bishop-style mathematics can also be developed in constructive type
theory (which will be discussed below) viewing sets as types equipped with an
equivalence relation (a.k.a. “setoids”).
Bishop-style constructive mathematics is, in a sense, the most “pure” (or, at
least, minimal) constructive approach discussed so far, in that it does not rely
on bar induction or the continuity principle from intuitionistic mathematics,
nor Markov’s principle from constructive recursive mathematics. This makes
the framework more appealing to classical mathematicians. For example, we
have seen that the Russian school defines a real number to be a computable real
number, and a function from reals to reals to be computable in an appropriate
sense. This means that classical mathematicians cannot view their theorems
about real numbers as such; they have to be interpreted as saying something
more restrictive. Similarly, the fact that, in a Brouwerian framework, all func-
tions on the real numbers are continuous shows that the Brouwerian notion of
function departs from the classical one. In contrast, even though it is consis-
tent with Bishop-style mathematics to think of all real numbers and functions
as being computable, the framework is fully consistent with ordinary classical
mathematics. In other words, the theorems in the framework can be viewed
as contemporary mathematical theorems, proved in such a way that the results
have additional computational significance.
Bishop’s work was continued by a number of people, including Douglas
Bridges, Ray Mines, Fred Richman, and many others, and remains a mainstay
of modern constructivity (see, for example, [17, 31]).
3.8 Intuitionistic higher-order arithmetic
The finite types, discussed in Section 3.6, trace back to Gottlob’s Frege founda-
tional system [63], which was built on a single base type of individuals. They
made their way, in modified form, into the ramified type theory of Russell and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica [185], and ultimately into Alonzo Church’s
formulation of higher order logic as simple type theory [40]. All of these systems
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include some form of a scheme of comprehension,
∃X ∀y (y ∈ X ↔ ϕ(y)),
which asserts that any formula ϕ with a free variable y of type σ gives rise to a
set, or predicate, X , of type σ → Bool. (More precisely, Frege’s “extensions” of
formulas stood as proxy for such objects.)
All of the systems just described are based on classical logic, but one can
just as well consider intuitionistic versions, for example, adding comprehension
axioms to HAω. The result is intuitionistic higher-order logic, or IHOL. From a
logical perspective, such a system is much stronger than HAω. One reason to
be interested in such a system is that it represents the internal logic of a topos,
the algebraic structure that Alexander Grothendieck used to study sheaves over
a space (see, for example, [146]).
It is perhaps a matter of debate whether intuitionistic higher-order logic de-
serves to be called “constructive.” But one thing that speaks in favor of this is
that one can give IHOL a computational interpretation. In fact, this can be done
in various ways, paralleling the various ways of giving a computational inter-
pretation to Go¨del’s T . For example, one can define an explicit normalization
procedure which reduces proofs of IHOL to a canonical normal form; methods
based on Girard’s candidats de reducibilite´ [74, 75] show the reduction procedure
always terminates. Alternatively, one can give a realizability interpretation by
interpreting IHOL in Martin Hyland’s effective topos [101].
3.9 Constructive type theory
At present, the predominant foundational frameworks for constructive mathe-
matics take the form of constructive type theory. Such frameworks unify two of
the foundational trends we have seen so far:
• type theory, in the Frege-Russell-Church-Go¨del tradition; and
• the notion of explicit “evidence” for a constructive claim, in the tradition
of the BHK interpretation and realizability.
It is the use of dependent types that makes this unification possible.
In simple type theory, types cannot depend on parameters. For example,
given a type A and a fixed natural number n, one can form the type An of
n-tuples of elements of A, but one cannot view these as a family of related
types that depend on the parameter n. In other words, one cannot view An
as a type that depends on a variable n of type N. This is exactly the sort of
thing that dependent type theory is designed to support. To start with, the
type A→ B of functions which take an argument in A and return a value in B
can be generalized to a dependent product
∏
x:A B(x), where B(x) is a type that
can depend on x. Intuitively, elements of this type are functions that map an
element a of A to an element of B(a). When B does not depend on x, the result
is just A→ B. Similarly, product types A× B can be generalized to dependent
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sums
∑
x:A B(x). Intuitively, elements of this type are pairs (a, b), where a is an
element of A and b is an element of B(a). When B does not depend on x, this
is just A× B.
The second conceptual innovation in constructive type theory is to internal-
ize the notion of constructive evidence. According to the BHK interpretation,
knowing a mathematical theorem amounts to having a construction that real-
izes the claim. Thus we can view any mathematical proposition as specifying
a special type of data, namely, the type of construction that is appropriate to
realizing it. This has come to be known as the “propositions as types correspon-
dence” or the “Curry-Howard correspondence” [45, 46, 97], developed by Curry,
Howard, Tait, Martin-Lo¨f, and Girard, among others. The point is that logical
operations look a lot like operations on datatypes. For example, in propositional
logic, from A and B one can conclude A ∧ B. One can read this as saying that
given a proof a of A and a proof b of B of B one can “pair” them to obtain
a proof (a, b) of A ∧ B. In other words, A ∧ B and A × B are governed by the
same rules. Similarly, the interpretation of implication A→ B mirrors the rules
for function types: giving a proof of A→ B amounts to constructing a function
from A to B. In the same way, a proof of ∀x : A B(x) is a function which, given
any a in A, return a proof of B(a).
Thus, in constructive type theory, some types are naturally viewed as types
of data and some are naturally viewed as propositions, but the two interact
and are governed by similar rules. A single calculus gives the rules for defining
mathematical objects and proving propositions; that is, the calculus provides a
set of rules for carrying out mathematical constructions of both sorts. Two of
the most commonly used systems today are Martin-Lo¨f type theory [151], and
the calculus of inductive constructions [43], which extends the original calcu-
lus of constructions due to Coquand and Huet [42]. The relationship between
the Martin-Lo¨f type theory and the calculus of constructions is similar to the
relationship between HAω and intuitionistic higher-order logic: the calculus of
constructions has “impredicative” comprehension principles that render it much
stronger than Martin-Lo¨f’s predicative counterpart.
As was the case with HAω and intuitionistic higher-order logic, one can
give these systems a computational interpretation in various ways. Indeed,
semantics for constructive type theory draws on the full range of the theory of
programming language semantics, making use of realizability interpretations,
strong normalization proofs, domain theory, and more. The literature on this
subject is extensive; see, for example, [4, 44].
3.10 Computational interpretations of classical theories
We characterized the Russian school of constructive recursive mathematics as
reasoning about computable objects in a constructive way. One can maintain
the first requirement axiomatically while giving up the second: for example,
the subsystem of second-order arithmetic known as RCA0 is a classical system
for which first-order quantifiers can be interpreted as ranging over the natural
numbers and second-order quantifiers can be interpreted as ranging over com-
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putable sets and functions. Thus RCA0 is a reasonable setting for formalizing
classical computable analysis (see [198]).
To what extent can one preserve a computational interpretation of quantifier
dependences in a formal system that includes the law of the excluded middle?
There is a trivial sense in which any reasonable classical theory has a computa-
tional interpretation. Let ϕ be a Π2 statement, that is, an assertion of the form
∀x ∃y R(x, y) where x and y range over natural numbers and R is a primitive
recursive relation. Suppose some classical theory T proves ϕ. Then, assuming
T can be trusted in this regard, ϕ is true, which means that a simple-minded
computer program that, on input x, searches systematically for a y satsifying
R(x, y) is guaranteed to succeed.
There is also a fundamental sense in which such an interpretation cannot be
extended to Π3 sentences. Let T (e, x, s) be Kleene’s primitive recursive relation
that expresses that s is a halting computation sequence for Turing machine e
on input x. Then the classically valid statement that any given Turing machine
e either halts on input 0 or doesn’t can be expressed as follows:
∀e ∃s ∀s′ (T (e, 0, s) ∨ ¬T (e, 0, s′)).
But any function mapping an e to an s satisfying the conclusion provides a solu-
tion to the halting problem, and thus there is no computable function witnessing
the ∀e ∃s dependence.
Nonetheless, one can often give classical logic an indirect computational in-
terpretation. One way to do this is to interpret a classical theory in a construc-
tive one, using the double-negation translation and tricks such as the Friedman-
Dragalin translation [51, 65] or the Dialectica interpretation [77, 7] to recover
Π2 theorems (see also [6, 41]). One can also provide more direct computational
interpretations, such as realizability relations of various sorts. Griffin [81] has
shown that classical logic can be understood in terms of a standard semantics for
programming languages with control operators, such as exceptions. This com-
putational interpretation is captured by the λµ-calculus designed by Parigot
[168] (see also [200]). Chetan Murthy [162] has shown that this interpretation
can be seen as the result of combining a double-negation translation with the
Friedman-Dragalin trick, and then using intuitionistic realizability. Jean-Louis
Krivine [127] has provided a realizability interpretation for full classical set the-
ory.
Sometimes what one wants from a classical proof is not a computational
interpretation per se, but useful computational or quantitative information that
is hidden by classical methods. In the 1950’s, Kreisel spoke of “unwinding”
classical proofs to obtain such information, a program which has developed
under the heading of “proof mining,” by Kohlenbach and others [119].
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Mart´ın Escardo´, Guido Gherardi, Andre´
Nies, Klaus Weihrauch, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and
suggestions. Avigad’s work has been partially supported by National Science
Foundation grant DMS-1068829 and Air Force Office of Scientific Research grant
35
FA9550-12-1-0370. Brattka’s research was supported by a Marie Curie Inter-
national Research Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the 7th European
Community Framework Programme and by the National Research Foundation
of South Africa.
References
[1] Oliver Aberth. The failure in computable analysis of a classical existence theorem
for differential equations. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society,
30:151–156, 1971.
[2] Oliver Aberth. Computable Analysis. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1980.
[3] N.L. Ackerman, C.E. Freer, and D.M. Roy. Noncomputable conditional dis-
tributions. In Logic in Computer Science (LICS), 2011, pages 107–116, IEEE
Conference Presentations, Los Alamitos, California, 2011.
[4] Thorsten Altenkirch. Proving strong normalization of CC by modifying realiz-
ability semantics. In Types for Proofs and Programs (Nijmegen, 1993), pages
3–18. Springer, Berlin, 1994.
[5] Jeremy Avigad. Uncomputably noisy ergodic limits. To appear in the Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
[6] Jeremy Avigad. Interpreting classical theories in constructive ones. Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 65:1785–1812, 2000.
[7] Jeremy Avigad and Solomon Feferman. Go¨del’s functional (“Dialectica”) inter-
pretation. In Samuel R. Buss, editor, Handbook of Proof Theory, pages 337–405,
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1998.
[8] Jeremy Avigad, Philipp Gerhardy, and Henry Towsner. Local stability of er-
godic averages. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 362:261–
288, 2010.
[9] Jeremy Avigad and Ksenija Simic. Fundamental notions of analysis in subsys-
tems of second-order arithmetic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 139:138–184,
2006.
[10] G. Baigger. Die Nichtkonstruktivita¨t des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes. Archiv
fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung, 25:183–188, 1985.
[11] Stefan Banach and Stanis law Mazur. Sur les fonctions calculables. Annales de
la Socie´te´ Polonaise de Mathe´matique, 16:223, 1937.
[12] Andrej Bauer. The Realizability Approach to Computable Analysis and Topol-
ogy. PhD thesis, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pitts-
burgh, 2000.
[13] Vero´nica Becher, Santiago Figueira, and Rafael Picchi. Turing’s unpublished al-
gorithm for normal numbers. Theoretical Computer Science, 377:126–138, 2007.
[14] Michael J. Beeson. Foundations of Constructive Mathematics. Springer, Berlin,
1985.
[15] Laurent Bienvenu, Adam R. Day, Mathieu Hoyrup, Ilya Mezhirov, and Alexan-
der Shen. A constructive version of Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem for Martin-Lo¨f
random points. Information and Computation, 210:21–30, 2012.
36
[16] Errett Bishop. Foundations of Constructive Analysis. McGraw-Hill, New York,
1967.
[17] Errett Bishop and Douglas S. Bridges. Constructive Analysis. Springer, Berlin,
1985.
[18] E´mile Borel. Le calcul des inte´grales de´finies. Journal de Mathe´matiques pures
et applique´es. Se´r. 6, 8:159–210, 1912.
[19] E´mile Borel. La the´orie de la mesure et al the´orie de l’integration. In Lec¸ons
sur la the´orie des fonctions, pages 214–256, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1950.
[20] Volker Bosserhoff. Notions of probabilistic computability on represented spaces.
Journal of Universal Computer Science, 14:956–995, 2008.
[21] Vasco Brattka. Effective Borel measurability and reducibility of functions. Math-
ematical Logic Quarterly, 51:19–44, 2005.
[22] Vasco Brattka and Guido Gherardi. Effective choice and boundedness principles
in computable analysis. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 17:73–117, 2011.
[23] Vasco Brattka and Guido Gherardi. Weihrauch degrees, omniscience principles
and weak computability. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 76:143–176, 2011.
[24] Vasco Brattka, Guido Gherardi, and Alberto Marcone. The Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem is the jump of weak Ko˝nig’s lemma. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
163:623–655, 2012.
[25] Vasco Brattka, Peter Hertling, and Klaus Weihrauch. A tutorial on computable
analysis. In S. Barry Cooper, Benedikt Lo¨we, and Andrea Sorbi, editors, New
Computational Paradigms: Changing Conceptions of What is Computable, pages
425–491. Springer, New York, 2008.
[26] Vasco Brattka, Joseph S. Miller, and Andre´ Nies. Randomness and differentia-
bility. Submitted; preliminary version at http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4465.
[27] Mark Braverman. Parabolic Julia sets are polynomial time computable. Non-
linearity, 19:1383–1401, 2006.
[28] Mark Braverman and Stephen Cook. Computing over the reals: Foundations for
scientific computing. Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 53:318–329,
2006.
[29] Mark Braverman and M. Yampolsky. Non-computable Julia sets. Journal of the
American Mathematical Society, 19:551–578, 2006.
[30] Mark Braverman and Michael Yampolsky. Computability of Julia Sets. Springer,
Berlin, 2008.
[31] Douglas Bridges and Fred Richman. Varieties of Constructive Mathematics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
[32] L. E. J. Brouwer. Begru¨ndung der Mengenlehre unabha¨ngig vom logischen
Satz vom ausgeschlossen Dritten. Erster Teil: Allgemeine Mengenlehre. Konin-
klijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, 12(5), 1918.
Reprinted in [35], pages 150–190.
[33] L. E. J. Brouwer. Begru¨ndung der Mengenlehre unabha¨ngig vom logischen Satz
vom ausgeschlossen Dritten. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der Punkmengen. Konin-
klijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, 12(7), 1919.
Reprinted in [35], pages 191–221.
37
[34] L. E. J. Brouwer. U¨ber Definitionsbereiche von- Funktionen. Mathematische
Annalen, 97(1):60–75, 1927.
[35] L. E. J. Brouwer. Collected Works, Volume I: Philosophy and Foundations of
Mathematics, edited by A. Heyting. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam,
1975.
[36] G.S. Ce˘ıtin. Algorithmic operators in constructive complete separable metric
spaces (in Russian). Doklady Akademii Nauk, 128:49–52, 1959.
[37] Douglas Cenzer and Jeffrey B. Remmel. Index sets in computable analysis.
Theoretical Computer Science, 219:111–150, 1999.
[38] Douglas Cenzer and Jeffrey B. Remmel. Effectively closed sets and graphs of
computable real functions. Theoretical Computer Science, 284:279–318, 2002.
[39] Douglas Cenzer and Jeffrey B. Remmel. Index sets for computable differential
equations. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 50:329–344, 2004.
[40] Alonzo Church. A formulation of the simple theory of types. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 5:56–68, 1940.
[41] Thierry Coquand and Martin Hofmann. A new method of establishing con-
servativity of classical systems over their intuitionistic version. Mathematical
Structures in Computer Science, 9:323–333, 1999.
[42] Thierry Coquand and Ge´rard Huet. The calculus of constructions. Information
and Computation, 76:95–120, 1988.
[43] Thierry Coquand and Christine Paulin. Inductively defined types. In COLOG-88
(Tallinn, 1988), pages 50–66. Springer, Berlin, 1990.
[44] Thierry Coquand and Arnaud Spiwack. A proof of strong normalisation using
domain theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 3(4), 2007.
[45] Haskell B. Curry. Functionality in combinatory logic. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 20:584–590, 1934.
[46] Haskell B. Curry and Robert Feys. Combinatory logic. Vol. I. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1958.
[47] Martin Davis. The Universal Computer: The Road from Leibniz to Turing.
W. W. Norton, New York, 2000.
[48] Osvald Demuth. Constructive pseudonumbers (in Russian). Comment. Math.
Univ. Carolinae, 16:315–331, 1975.
[49] Osvald Demuth. The differentiability of constructive functions of weakly
bounded variation on pseudo numbers (Russian). Comment. Math. Univ. Car-
olinae, 16:583–599, 1975.
[50] Rodney G. Downey and Denis R. Hirschfeldt. Algorithmic randomness and
complexity. Springer, New York, 2010.
[51] Albert Dragalin. Mathematical Intuitionism: Introduction to Proof Theory.
American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 1988.
[52] Michael Dummett. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford University Press, New
York, second edition, 2000.
[53] Abbas Edalat. A computable approach to measure and integration theory. In-
formation and Computation, 207:642–659, 2009.
38
[54] Abbas Edalat and Philipp Su¨nderhauf. A domain-theoretic approach to com-
putability on the real line. Theoretical Computer Science, 210:73–98, 1999.
[55] Harold M. Edwards. Kronecker’s views on the foundations of mathematics. In
D. E. Rowe and J. McCleary, editors, The History of Modern Mathematics, pages
67–77. Academic Press, San Diego, 1989.
[56] Harold M. Edwards. Kronecker’s fundamental theorem of general arithmetic. In
Episodes in the history of modern algebra (1800–1950), pages 107–116. American
Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 2007.
[57] Harold M. Edwards. Kronecker’s algorithmic mathematics. Mathematical Intel-
ligencer, 31:11–14, 2009.
[58] William Ewald, editor. From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations
of Mathematics, volumes 1 and 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.
[59] Johanna Franklin, Noam Greenberg, Joseph S. Miller, and Keng Meng Ng.
Martin-Lo¨f random points satisfy Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem for effectively
closed sets. To appear in the Proceedings of the American Mathematical So-
ciety.
[60] Johanna Franklin and Henry Towsner. Randomness and Non-ergodic Systems.
arXiv:1206.2682.
[61] Cameron Freer, Bjørn Kjoss-Hansen, Andre´ Nies, and Frank Stephan. Algorith-
mic aspects of Lipschitz functions. Preprint.
[62] Cameron E. Freer and Daniel M. Roy. Computable de Finetti measures. Annals
Pure Applied Logic, 163:530–546, 2012.
[63] Gottlob Frege. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Band I. Hermann Pohle, Jena,
1893.
[64] Harvey Friedman. On the computational complexity of maximization and inte-
gration. Advances in Mathematics, 53:80–98, 1984.
[65] Harvey M. Friedman. Classically and intuitionistically provable functions. In
H. Mu¨ller and D. Scott, editors, Higher Set Theory, pages 21–27. Springer,
Berlin, 1978.
[66] Peter Ga´cs. Uniform test of algorithmic randomness over a general space. The-
oretical Computer Science, 341:91–137, 2005.
[67] Peter Ga´cs, Mathieu Hoyrup, and Cristo´bal Rojas. Randomness on computable
probability spaces—a dynamical point of view. Theory of Computing Systems,
48:465–485, 2011.
[68] Stefano Galatolo, Mathieu Hoyrup, and Cristo´bal Rojas. A constructive Borel-
Cantelli lemma: constructing orbits with required statistical properties. Theo-
retical Computer Science, 410:2207–2222, 2009.
[69] Stefano Galatolo, Mathieu Hoyrup, and Cristo´bal Rojas. Effective symbolic
dynamics, random points, statistical behavior, complexity and entropy. Infor-
mation and Computation, 208:23–41, 2010.
[70] Gerhard Gentzen. Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie. Mathema-
tische Annalen, 112:493–465, 1936. Translated as “The consistency of elementary
number theory” in [71], pages 132–213.
[71] Gerhard Gentzen. Collected Works, edited by M. E. Szabo. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1969.
39
[72] Guido Gherardi. Alan Turing and the foundations of computable analysis. Bul-
letin of Symbolic Logic, 17:394–430, 2011.
[73] Guido Gherardi and Alberto Marcone. How incomputable is the separable Hahn-
Banach theorem? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 50:393–425, 2009.
[74] Jean-Yves Girard. Une extension de l’interpre´tation de Go¨del a` l’analyse, et son
application a` l’e´limination des coupures dans l’analyse et la the´orie des types. In
Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, pages 63–92. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1971.
[75] Jean-Yves Girard, Yves Lafont, and Paul Taylor. Proofs and Types. Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
[76] Kurt Go¨del. Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie. Ergebnisse
eines mathematischen Kolloquiums, 4:34–38, 1933. Translated by Stefan Bauer-
Mengelberg and Jean van Heijenoort as “On intuitionistic arithmetic and num-
ber theory” in [218], reprinted in [78] (1933e), pages 287–295.
[77] Kurt Go¨del. U¨ber eine bisher noch nicht benu¨tzte Erweiterung des finiten Stand-
punktes. Dialectica, 12:280–287, 1958. Reprinted with English translation in Fe-
ferman et al., eds., Kurt Go¨del: Collected Works, volume 2, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1990, pages 241–251.
[78] Kurt Go¨del. Collected Works, volume I, edited by Solomon Feferman et al.
Oxford University Press, New York, 1986.
[79] R. L. Goodstein. Recursive Number Theory: A Development of Recursive Arith-
metic in a Logic-Free Equation Calculus. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1957.
[80] R. L. Goodstein. Recursive Analysis. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1961.
[81] Timothy G. Griffin. A formulae-as-type notion of control. In Proceedings of
the 17th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages (POPL ’90), pages 47–58, Association for Computing Machinery,
New York, 1990.
[82] Andrzej Grzegorczyk. Computable functionals. Fundamenta Mathematicae,
42:168–202, 1955.
[83] Andrzej Grzegorczyk. On the definition of computable functionals. Fundamenta
Mathematicae, 42:232–239, 1955.
[84] Andrzej Grzegorczyk. On the definitions of computable real continuous func-
tions. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 44:61–71, 1957.
[85] Andrzej Grzegorczyk. Some approaches to constructive analysis. In A. Heyting,
editor, Constructivity in mathematics, pages 43–61, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1959.
[86] Ju¨rgen Hauck. Ein Kriterium fu¨r die Annahme des Maximums in der Berechen-
baren Analysis. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Math-
ematik, 17:193–196, 1971.
[87] Ju¨rgen Hauck. Konstruktive Darstellungen reeller Zahlen und Folgen. Zeitschrift
fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 24:365–374, 1978.
[88] Ju¨rgen Hauck. Konstruktive Darstellungen in topologischen Ra¨umen mit rekur-
siver Basis. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathe-
matik, 26:565–576, 1980.
40
[89] Peter Hertling. Effectivity and effective continuity of functions between com-
putable metric spaces. In Douglas S. Bridges, Cristian S. Calude, Jeremy Gib-
bons, Steve Reeves, and Ian H. Witten, editors, Combinatorics, Complexity, and
Logic, Springer, Singapore, 1997.
[90] Peter Hertling. An effective Riemann Mapping Theorem. Theoretical Computer
Science, 219:225–265, 1999.
[91] Peter Hertling. A real number structure that is effectively categorical. Mathe-
matical Logic Quarterly, 45:147–182, 1999.
[92] Peter Hertling. A Banach-Mazur computable but not Markov computable func-
tion on the computable real numbers. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
132:227–246, 2005.
[93] Peter Hertling and Klaus Weihrauch. Random elements in effective topological
spaces with measure. Information and Computation, 181:32–56, 2003.
[94] Arendt Heyting. Intuitionism: An Introduction. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1956.
[95] Arendt Heyting. Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik. I, II, III. In
Sitzungsberichte Akad. Berlin, pages 42–56, 57–71, 158–169, 1930.
[96] David Hilbert and Paul Bernays. Grundlagen der Mathematik. Springer, Berlin,
first volume, 1934, second volume, 1939.
[97] W. A. Howard. The formulae-as-types notion of construction. In To H. B.
Curry: Essays on Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus and Formalism, pages
480–490. Academic Press, London, 1980.
[98] Mathieu Hoyrup and Cristo´bal Rojas. Computability of probability measures
and Martin-Lo¨f randomness over metric spaces. Information and Computation,
207:830–847, 2009.
[99] Mathieu Hoyrup, Cristo´bal Rojas, and Klaus Weihrauch. Computability of the
Radon-Nikodym derivative. In Benedikt Lo¨we, Dag Normann, Ivan Soskov, and
Alexandra Soskova, editors, Models of Computation in Context, pages 132–141,
Springer, Berlin, 2011.
[100] Mathieu Hoyrup, Cristo´bal Rojas, and Klaus Weihrauch. Computability of the
Radon-Nikodym derivative. Computability, 1:3–13, 2012.
[101] J. M. E. Hyland. The effective topos. In The L.E.J. Brouwer Centenary Sym-
posium (Noordwijkerhout, 1981), pages 165–216. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1982.
[102] Iraj Kalantari and Larry Welch. A blend of methods of recursion theory and
topology. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 124:141–178, 2003.
[103] Iraj Kalantari and Lawrence Welch. Point-free topological spaces, functions and
recursive points; filter foundation for recursive analysis. I. Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic, 93:125–151, 1998.
[104] Iraj Kalantari and Lawrence Welch. Recursive and nonextendible functions over
the reals; filter foundation for recursive analysis, II. Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic, 98:87–110, 1999.
[105] Akitoshi Kawamura. Lipschitz continuous ordinary differential equations are
polynomial-space complete. Computational Complexity, 19:305–332, 2010.
41
[106] Akitoshi Kawamura and Stephen Cook. Complexity theory for operators in
analysis. In Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
(STOC ’10), pages 495–502, Association for Computing Machinery, New York,
2010.
[107] Dieter Klaua. Berechenbare Analysis. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 2:265–303, 1956.
[108] Dieter Klaua. Konstruktive Analysis. Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften,
Berlin, 1961.
[109] Stephen Cole Kleene. Recursive predicates and quantifiers. Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society, 53:41–73, 1943.
[110] Stephen Cole Kleene. On the interpretation of intuitionistic number theory.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 10:109–124, 1945.
[111] Stephen Cole Kleene. Introduction to Metamathematics. D. Van Nostrand Co.,
New York, 1952.
[112] Stephen Cole Kleene and Richard Eugene Vesley. The Foundations of Intuition-
istic Mathematics, Especially in Relation to Recursive Functions. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1965.
[113] Ker-I Ko. The maximum value problem and NP real numbers. Journal of
Computer and Systems Sciences, 24:15–35, 1982.
[114] Ker-I Ko. Some negative results on the computational complexity of total vari-
ation and differentiation. Information and Control, 53:21–31, 1982.
[115] Ker-I Ko. On the computational complexity of ordinary differential equations.
Information and Control, 58:157–194, 1983.
[116] Ker-I Ko. On the computational complexity of integral equations. Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, 58:201–228, 1992.
[117] Ker-I Ko and H. Friedman. Computational complexity of real functions. Theo-
retical Computer Science, 20:323–352, 1982.
[118] Ker-I Ko and H. Friedman. Computing power series in polynomial time. Ad-
vances in Applied Mathematics, 9:40–50, 1988.
[119] Ulrich Kohlenbach. Applied Proof Theory: Proof Interpretations and their Use
in Mathematics. Springer, Berlin, 2008.
[120] Georg Kreisel. On the interpretation of non-finitist proofs II. Interpretation of
number theory. Applications. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 17:43–58, 1952.
[121] Georg Kreisel. Some elementary inequalities. Nederl. Akad. Wetensch. Proc.
Ser. A. 55 = Indagationes Math., 14:334–338, 1952.
[122] Georg Kreisel, Daniel Lacombe, and J.R. Shoenfield. Fonctionnelles
re´cursivement de´finissables et fonctionnelles re´cursives. Comptes Rendus de
l’Acade´mie des Sciences Paris, 245:399–402, 1957.
[123] Georg Kreisel, Daniel Lacombe, and J.R. Shoenfield. Partial recursive function-
als and effective operations. In A. Heyting, editor, Constructivity in Mathemat-
ics, pages 290–297, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1959.
[124] Georg Kreisel and Daniel Lacombe. Ensembles re´cursivement mesurables et
ensembles re´cursivement ouverts et ferme´s. Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sci-
ences Paris, 245:1106–1109, 1957.
42
[125] Christoph Kreitz and Klaus Weihrauch. Theory of representations. Theoretical
Computer Science, 38:35–53, 1985.
[126] Christoph Kreitz and Klaus Weihrauch. Compactness in constructive analysis
revisited. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 36:29–38, 1987.
[127] Jean-Louis Krivine. Typed lambda-calculus in classical Zermelo-Frænkel set
theory. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 40:189–205, 2001.
[128] Leopold Kronecker. Grundzu¨ge einer arithmetischen Theorie der algebraischen
Gro¨ssen. Riemer, Berlin, 1882. Also published in Journal fu¨r reine und ange-
wandte Mathematik, volume 92, 1882, pages 1–122, and [132], volume II, pages
237–387.
[129] Leopold Kronecker. Ein Fundamentalsatz der allgemeinen Arithmetik. Journal
fu¨r die reine und angewandte Mathematik, 100:490–510, 1887. Reprinted in [132],
vol. IIIa, pages 209–240.
[130] Leopold Kronecker. U¨ber den Zahlbegriff. In Philosophische Aufsa¨tze, Eduard
Zeller zu seinem fu¨nfzigja¨hrigen Doctorjubila¨um gewidmet, pages 261–274. Fues,
Leipzig, 1887. Reprinted in [132], volume IIIa, pages 249–274. Translated as “On
the concept of number” by William Ewald in [58], volume 2, pages 947–955.
[131] Leopold Kronecker. Vorlesungen u¨ber Zahlentheorie, edited by Kurt Hensel.
Teubner, Leipzig, 1901. Republished by Springer, Berlin, 1978.
[132] Leopold Kronecker. Werke, volumes 1–5, edited by Kurt Hensel. Chelsea Pub-
lishing Co., New York, 1968.
[133] Boris A. Kushner. Lectures on Constructive Mathematical Analysis, translated
from the Russian by E. Mendelson. American Mathematical Society, Providence,
RI, 1984.
[134] Boris A. Kushner. The constructive mathematics of A. A. Markov. American
Mathematical Monthly, 113:559–566, 2006.
[135] Anton´ın Kucˇera and Andre´ Nies. Demuth’s path to randomness. In Proceedings
of the 2012 International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Com-
putation, Physics and Beyond (WTCS 2012), pages 159–173, Springer, Berlin,
2012.
[136] Daniel Lacombe. Classes re´cursivement ferme´s et fonctions majorantes. Comptes
Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences Paris, 240:716–718, June 1955.
[137] Daniel Lacombe. Remarques sur les ope´rateurs re´cursifs et sur les fonctions
re´cursives d’une variable re´elle. Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences Paris,
241:1250–1252, 1955.
[138] Daniel Lacombe. Extension de la notion de fonction re´cursive aux fonctions
d’une ou plusieurs variables re´elles I-III. Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences
Paris, 240,241:2478–2480,13–14,151–153, 1955.
[139] Daniel Lacombe. Les ensembles re´cursivement ouverts ou ferme´s, et leurs ap-
plications a` l’Analyse re´cursive. Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences Paris,
245:1040–1043, 1957.
[140] Daniel Lacombe. Quelques proprie´te´s d’analyse re´cursive. Comptes Rendus
Acade´mie des Sciences Paris, 244:838–840,996–997, 1957.
[141] Daniel Lacombe. Les ensembles re´cursivement ouverts ou ferme´s, et leurs ap-
plications a` l’Analyse re´cursive. Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences Paris,
246:28–31, 1958.
43
[142] Daniel Lacombe. Sur les possibilites d’extension de la notion de fonction
re´cursive aux fonctions d’une ou plusieurs variables re´elles. In Le raisonnement
en mathematiques et en sciences, pages 67–75, Editions du Centre National de
la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1958.
[143] Daniel Lacombe. Quelques proce´de´s de de´finition en topologie re´cursive. In
A. Heyting, editor, Constructivity in Mathematics, pages 129–158, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1959.
[144] Ste´phane Le Roux and Martin Ziegler. Singular coverings and non-uniform
notions of closed set computability. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 54:545–560,
2008.
[145] Peter Lietz. From Constructive Mathematics to Computable Analysis via the Re-
alizability Interpretation. PhD thesis, Fachbereich Mathematik, TU Darmstadt,
Darmstadt, 2004.
[146] Saunders Mac Lane and Ieke Moerdijk. Sheaves in Geometry and Logic. Springer,
New York, 1994.
[147] A. A. Markov. On the continuity of constructive functions (in Rrussian). Uspekhi
Matematicheskikh Nauk, 9:226–230, 1954.
[148] A. A. Markov. On constructive functions. Trudy Mat. Inst. Steklov, 52:315–348,
1958. (in Russian, English trans. in AMS Trans. (2) 29, 1963).
[149] Per Martin-Lo¨f. The definition of random sequences. Information and Control,
9:602–619, 1966.
[150] Per Martin-Lo¨f. Notes on Constructive Mathematics. Almqvist and Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1970.
[151] Per Martin-Lo¨f. An intuitionistic theory of types: predicative part. In H. E.
Rose and J. C. Shepherdson, editors, Logic Colloquium ’73. North-Holland, Am-
sterdam, 1973.
[152] Alec Matheson and Timothy H. McNicholl. Computable analysis and Blaschke
products. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 136:321–332, 2008.
[153] Alec Matheson and Timothy H. McNicholl. Computable analysis and Blaschke
products. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 136:321–332, 2008.
[154] Stanis law Mazur. Computable Analysis. Razprawy Matematyczne, Warsaw,
1963.
[155] Timothy H. McNicholl. Uniformly computable aspects of inner functions: esti-
mation and factorization. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 54:508–518, 2008.
[156] Timothy H. McNicholl. A uniformly computable implicit function theorem.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 54:272–279, 2008.
[157] George Metakides and Anil Nerode. The introduction of non-recursive methods
into mathematics. In A.S. Troelstra and D. van Dalen, editors, The L.E.J.
Brouwer Centenary Symposium, pages 319–335, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1982.
[158] George Metakides, Anil Nerode, and R.A. Shore. Recursive limits on the Hahn-
Banach theorem. In Murray Rosenblatt, editor, Errett Bishop: Reflections on
Him and His Research, American Mathematical Society, 1985.
[159] Joseph Stephen Miller. Pi-0-1 Classes in Computable Analysis and Topology.
PhD thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, USA, 2002.
44
[160] Yiannis Nicholas Moschovakis. Recursive metric spaces. Fundamenta Mathe-
maticae, 55:215–238, 1964.
[161] Andrzej Mostowski. On computable sequences. Fundamenta Mathematicae,
44:37–51, 1957.
[162] Chetan R. Murthy. An evaluation semantics for classical proofs. In Proceedings,
Sixth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, pages 96–107,
Amsterdam, 1991.
[163] John Myhill. A recursive function defined on a compact interval and having
a continuous derivative that is not recursive. Michigan Mathematical Journal,
18:97–98, 1971.
[164] David Nelson. Recursive functions and intuitionistic number theory. Transac-
tions of the American Mathematical Society, 61:307–368, 1947.
[165] Andre´ Nies. Computability and Randomness. Oxford University Press, New
York, 2009.
[166] Cristo´bal Rojas, Noopur Pathak, and Stephen G. Simpson. Schnorr randomness
and the Lebesgue differentiation theorem. To appear in the Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic.
[167] V. P. Orevkov. A constructive mapping of the square onto itself displacing
every constructive point (in Russian). Doklady Akademii Nauk, 152:55–58, 1963.
Translated in: Soviet Math. - Dokl., 4 (1963) 1253–1256.
[168] Michel Parigot. λµ-calculus: an algorithmic interpretation of classical natu-
ral deduction. In Logic programming and automated reasoning (St. Petersburg,
1992). Springer, Berlin, 1992.
[169] Noopur Pathak. A computational aspect of the Lebesgue differentiation theorem.
Journal of Logic and Analysis, (1:9):1–15, 2009.
[170] Arno Pauly. How incomputable is finding Nash equilibria? Journal of Universal
Computer Science, 16:2686–2710, 2010.
[171] Arno Pauly. On the (semi)lattices induced by continuous reducibilities. Mathe-
matical Logic Quarterly, 56:488–502, 2010.
[172] Roger Penrose. The Emperor’s New Mind. Concerning Computers, Minds and
The Laws of Physics. Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.
[173] Ro´zsa Pe´ter. Rekursive Funktionen. Akademischer Verlag, Budapest, 1951.
[174] Marian Pour-El and J. Caldwell. On a simple definition of computable functions
of a real variable. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der
Mathematik, 21:1–19, 1975.
[175] Marian Pour-El and Ning Zhong. The wave equation with computable initial
data whose unique solution is nowhere computable. Mathematical Logic Quar-
terly, 43:499–509, 1997.
[176] Marian B. Pour-El and J. Ian Richards. Computability in Analysis and Physics.
Springer, Berlin, 1989.
[177] Marian Boykan Pour-El and J. Ian Richards. A computable ordinary differential
equation which possesses no computable solution. Annals of Mathematical Logic,
17:61–90, 1979.
45
[178] Marian Boykan Pour-El and J. Ian Richards. The wave equation with com-
putable initial data such that its unique solution is not computable. Advances
in Mathematics, 39:215–239, 1981.
[179] Marian Boykan Pour-El and J. Ian Richards. Noncomputability in analysis
and physics: a complete determination of the class of noncomputable linear
operators. Advances in Mathemematics, 48:44–74, 1983.
[180] Robert Rettinger and Klaus Weihrauch. The computational complexity of some
Julia sets. In Michel X. Goemans, editor, Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 177–185, Association for Computing
Machinery, New York, 2003.
[181] Robert Rettinger and Xizhong Zheng. On the hierarchy and extension of mono-
tonically computable real numbers. Journal of Complexity, 19:672–691, 2003.
[182] Robert Rettinger and Xizhong Zheng. A hierarchy of Turing degrees of diver-
gence bounded computable real numbers. Journal of Complexity, 22:818–826,
2006.
[183] H. Gordon Rice. Recursive real numbers. Proceedings of the American Mathe-
matical Society, 5:784–791, 1954.
[184] R.M. Robinson. Review of “Peter, R., Rekursive Funktionen”. The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 16:280–282, 1951.
[185] Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. Principia Mathematica. Cam-
bridge University Press, first volume, 1910; second volume, 1912; third volume,
1913.
[186] Jason Rute. Algorithmic randomness, martingales, and differentiability. In
preparation.
[187] Claus Peter Schnorr. Komplexita¨t von Algorithmen mit Anwendung auf die
Analysis. Archiv fu¨r Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung, 14:54–68,
1971.
[188] Claus Peter Schnorr. Zufa¨lligkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, volume 218 of Lecture
Notes in Mathematics. Springer, Berlin, 1971.
[189] Arnold Scho¨nhage. Numerik analytischer Funktionen und Komplexita¨t. Jahres-
bericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, 92:1–20, 1990.
[190] Matthias Schro¨der. Topological spaces allowing type 2 complexity theory. In Ker-
I Ko and Klaus Weihrauch, editors, Computability and Complexity in Analysis,
pages 41–53. FernUniversita¨t Hagen, September 1995.
[191] Matthias Schro¨der. Fast online multiplication of real numbers. In Ru¨diger
Reischuk and Michel Morvan, editors, STACS 97, pages 81–92, Springer, Berlin,
1997.
[192] Matthias Schro¨der. Online computations of differentiable functions. Theoretical
Computer Science, 219:331–345, 1999.
[193] Matthias Schro¨der. Extended admissibility. Theoretical Computer Science,
284:519–538, 2002.
[194] Matthias Schro¨der. Spaces allowing type-2 complexity theory revisited. Mathe-
matical Logic Quarterly, 50:443–459, 2004.
[195] Matthias Schro¨der. Admissible representations for probability measures. Math-
ematical Logic Quarterly, 53:431–445, 2007.
46
[196] Dana Scott. Outline of a mathematical theory of computation. Technical Mono-
graph PRG-2, Oxford University, Oxford, November 1970.
[197] Ksenija Simic. The pointwise ergodic theorem in subsystems of second-order
arithmetic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 72:45–66, 2007.
[198] Stephen G. Simpson. Subsystems of second order arithmetic. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, second edition, 2009.
[199] Thoralf Skolem. Begru¨ndung der elementaren Arithmetik durch die rekur-
rierende Denkweise ohne Anwendung scheinbarer Vera¨ngerlichen mit un-
endlichen Ausdehnungsberich. In Skrifter, Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo,
Matematisk-Naturvidenskapelig Klasse, volume 6, pages 1–38. J. Dybwad, Oslo.
Translated in [218], pages 302–333.
[200] Morten H. Sørensen and Pawel Urzyczyn. Lectures on the Curry-Howard Iso-
morphism. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2006.
[201] Ernst Specker. Nicht konstruktiv beweisbare Sa¨tze der Analysis. The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 14:145–158, 1949.
[202] Ernst Specker. Der Satz vom Maximum in der rekursiven Analysis. In A. Heyt-
ing, editor, Constructivity in Mathematics, pages 254–265, North-Holland, Am-
sterdam, 1959.
[203] Howard Stein. Logos, Logic, and Logistike´. In William Aspray and Philip
Kitcher, editors, History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, pages 238–
259. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1988.
[204] William W. Tait. Intensional interpretations of functionals of finite type, I. The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 32:198–212, 1967.
[205] A. S. Troelstra. Metamathematical Investigation of Intuitionistic Arithmetic and
Analysis. Springer, Berlin, 1973.
[206] A. S. Troelstra. Realizability. In Samuel R. Buss, editor, Handbook of Proof
Theory, pages 407–473, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1998.
[207] A. S. Troelstra and Dirk van Dalen. Constructivism in Mathematics: An Intro-
duction. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1988.
[208] Alan M. Turing. On computable numbers, with an application to the “Entschei-
dungsproblem”. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42:230–265,
1936.
[209] Alan M. Turing. On computable numbers, with an application to the “Entschei-
dungsproblem”. A correction. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
43:544–546, 1937.
[210] Alan M. Turing. Finite approximations to Lie groups. Annals of Mathematics,
39:105–111, 1938.
[211] Alan M. Turing. Systems of logic based on ordinals. Proceedings of the London
Mathematical Society (2), 45:161–228, 1939.
[212] Alan M. Turing. A method for the calculation of the zeta-function. Proceedings
of the London Mathematical Society (2), 48:180–197, 1943.
[213] Alan M. Turing. Rounding-off errors in matrix processes. Quarterly Journal of
Mechanics and Applied Mathematics, 1:287–308, 1948.
47
[214] Alan M. Turing. Some calculations of the Riemann zeta-function. Proc. London
Math. Soc. (3), 3:99–117, 1953.
[215] V.A. Uspensky and A.L. Semenov. Basic Developments Connected with the
Concept of Algorithm and with Its Applications in Mathematics. In Andrei P.
Ershov and Donald E. Knuth, editors, Algorithms in Modern Mathematics and
Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, 1981.
[216] Mark van Atten. On Brouwer. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont, CA,
2004.
[217] Mark van Atten. Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer. In Edward N. Zalta, editor,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2011 edition, 2011.
[218] Jean van Heijenoort. From Frege to Go¨del: A Sourcebook in Mathematical logic,
1879-1931. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967.
[219] John von Neumann. Die formalistische Grundlegung der Mathematik. Erken-
ntnis, 2:116–121, 1931. Translated by E. Putnam and G. J. Massey as “The
Formalist Foundations of Mathematics” in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, eds.,
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd. ed., Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1983, pages 61–65.
[220] V. V. V’yugin. Ergodic convergence in probability, and an ergodic theorem for
individual random sequences. Teor. Veroyatnost. i Primenen., 42:35–50, 1997.
[221] V. V. V’yugin. Ergodic theorems for individual random sequences. Theoretical
Computer Science, 207:343–361, 1998.
[222] Klaus Weihrauch. Computability. Springer, Berlin, 1987.
[223] Klaus Weihrauch. Computability on the probability measures on the Borel sets
of the unit interval. Theoretical Computer Science, 219:421–437, 1999.
[224] Klaus Weihrauch. Computable Analysis. Springer, Berlin, 2000.
[225] Klaus Weihrauch. Computational complexity on computable metric spaces.
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 49:3–21, 2003.
[226] Klaus Weihrauch and Christoph Kreitz. Representations of the real numbers
and of the open subsets of the set of real numbers. Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic, 35:247–260, 1987.
[227] Klaus Weihrauch and Ning Zhong. Is wave propagation computable or can wave
computers beat the Turing machine? Proceedings of the London Mathematical
Society, 85:312–332, 2002.
[228] Klaus Weihrauch and Ning Zhong. Computing the solution of the Korteweg-
de Vries equation with arbitrary precision on Turing machines. Theoretical
Computer Science, 332:337–366, 2005.
[229] Klaus Weihrauch and Ning Zhong. An algorithm for computing fundamental
solutions. SIAM Journal on Computing, 35:1283–1294, 2006.
[230] Klaus Weihrauch and Ning Zhong. Computing Schro¨dinger propagators on
Type-2 Turing machines. Journal of Complexity, 22:918–935, 2006.
[231] Klaus Weihrauch and Ning Zhong. Computable analysis of the abstract Cauchy
problem in a Banach space and its applications I. Mathematical Logic Quarterly,
53:511–531, 2007.
48
[232] Norbert Wiener. Time, Communication, and the Nervous System. Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences, 50:197–220, 1948.
[233] Philip P. Wiener, editor. Leibniz: Selections. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York,
1951.
[234] Yongcheng Wu and Klaus Weihrauch. A computable version of the Daniell-Stone
theorem on integration and linear functionals. Theoretical Computer Science,
359:28–42, 2006.
[235] Mariko Yasugi, Takakazu Mori, and Yoshiki Tsujii. Effective properties of sets
and functions in metric spaces with computability structure. Theoretical Com-
puter Science, 219:467–486, 1999.
[236] Xiaokang Yu. Riesz representation theorem, Borel measures and subsystems of
second-order arithmetic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 59:65–78, 1993.
[237] Xiaokang Yu. Lebesgue convergence theorems and reverse mathematics. Math-
ematical Logic Quarterly, 40:1–13, 1994.
[238] Xiaokang Yu and Stephen G. Simpson. Measure theory and weak Ko¨nig’s lemma.
Archive for Mathematical Logic, 30:171–180, 1990.
[239] I. D. Zaslavskij. Disproof of some theorems of classical analysis in constructive
analysis (in Russian). Uspekhi Matematicheskikh Nauk, 10:209–210, 1955.
[240] Xizhong Zheng and Klaus Weihrauch. The arithmetical hierarchy of real num-
bers. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 47:51–65, 2001.
[241] Ning Zhong and Klaus Weihrauch. Computability theory of generalized func-
tions. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 50:469–505, 2003.
[242] Qing Zhou. Computable real-valued functions on recursive open and closed
subsets of Euclidean space. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 42:379–409, 1996.
[243] Martin Ziegler. Real hypercomputation and continuity. Theory of Computing
Systems, 41:177–206, 2007.
49
